



Why did the Industrial Revolution Start in Britain?† 
 
Leif van Neuss‡ 
HEC - University of Liège 
 




The main goal of this paper is to provide an integrated overview of the literature devoted to 
identifying the causes of the British industrial revolution. Why did the industrial revolution, a 
fascinating and multifaceted event which brought about modern economic growth, occur in 
eighteenth-century Britain? This question has animated a lot of discussions among scholars 
and is still nowadays heatedly debated in the literature. This debate is reflected in the large 
spectrum of theories which aim at explaining the true origins of the British industrialization. 
The paper first sheds light on a rising debate concerning the evolution of British incomes per 
capita before the British industrial revolution and the “Great Divergence”. The paper then 
investigates the proposed causes of the British industrialization, aggregating them into seven 
broad categories, i.e. (1) geography and natural resources, (2) demography, (3) agricultural 
progress, (4) demand-side factors, (5) trade and empire, (6) institutional and political factors, 
(7) science, technology, and human capital.        
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The industrial revolution, which started in Britain before sweeping through Europe and the 
USA, is traditionally viewed as the deepest mutation ever known to have affected men since 
Neolithic times. As Cipolla (1975:7) contended: “Between 1780 and 1850, in less than three 
generations, a far-reaching revolution, without precedent in the history of Mankind, changed 
the face of England. From then on, the world was no longer the same. Historians have often 
used and abused the word revolution to mean a radical change, but no revolution has been 
as dramatically revolutionary as the Industrial Revolution, except perhaps the Neolithic 
Revolution”1. The industrial revolution shaped the face of new industrial and economically 
successful societies by modifying their social and economic structures and destabilizing all 
established hierarchies. It eventually influenced every aspect of people’s daily life. Thanks to 
the introduction of new high-impact inventions into the world of production, which emerged 
in a changing intellectual environment, the human power of production was released in a 
spectacular way. The industrial revolution indeed witnessed an explosion of the production 
of various manufactured goods such as textile items and metal products. Equipped with new 
technologies, the industrializing economies were henceforth able to produce an increasingly 
larger quantity of products to answer the basic needs of a growing population characterized 
by new consumption habits and aspirations. The industrial growth was accompanied by the 
large-scale development of the transport infrastructure (roads, canals and railroads) that 
contributed to expanding the markets and speeding up the commercial flows. The factory 
system, a new form of labor organization, developed progressively and started to regulate 
people’s life as never before. Combined with the modernization of agriculture, the industrial 
revolution moreover accelerated the urbanization process in the industrializing countries. It 
also witnessed the emergence of a new social structure characterized by the consecration of 
a more-and-more powerful and influential bourgeoisie, animated by a rising capitalist spirit, 
and the birth of a new working class sometimes called “the proletariat”. All these changes 
helped to transform the societies which successfully undertook an industrial revolution and 
move their economy on a new growth trajectory. The industrial revolution is to some extent 
the birth certificate of the modern world.  
 
According to traditional historiography, the industrial revolution first started in Britain in the 
second half of the 18th century. The annus mirabilis year 1769, as Cardwell (1972) has called 
it, during which James Watt and Richard Arkwright patented respectively the separate 
condenser for the steam engine and the water frame, has often been considered as the 
symbolic starting point of the British industrialization. The industrial revolution then swept 
through Europe - first in Belgium and France - and the USA, before reaching Japan and Russia 
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by the end of the 19th century. In reality, it’s particularly difficult to date precisely when the 
industrial revolution began in one specific country. Even though historians like resorting to 
symbols to date the periods of history, the beginning of the industrial revolution, contrary to 
some historical events like the world wars, cannot seriously be assimilated to one specific 
year. From an economic point of view, there seems to be a consensus on the idea that the 
industrial revolution corresponds to an increase in the rates of efficiency growth. According 
to Clark (2007a:139)’s estimates, the average rate of efficiency growth through technological 
change in the world economy was close to 0 before 1760. Between 1760 and 1860, the 
average rate of efficiency growth in England rose to 0.5% per year (Clark, 2010a: table 34), a 
rate still modest by later standards - i.e. compared to the rates of total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth achieved by modern successful economies located at or near the technological 
frontier in the 20th century - but remarkable given its sustained character. In Clark (2014)’s 
terms, this upsurge in efficiency advance was a singularity, a unique break in world economic 
history, marking the onset of what Huntington (1996) has called the “Great Divergence” 
between the successful Western countries and the rest of the world. As Clark (2014:219) 
defended: “Before the Industrial Revolution we find no sign of any equivalent efficiency 
advances. This is true globally all the way from 10,000 BC to 1800”. As shown in table 1, the 
textile industry, which saw the emergence of many technological inventions, contributed 
43% of all measured productivity advance in England between 1780 and 1860. Transport, 
especially with the development of the railway, and agriculture were respectively the second 
and third biggest source of efficiency advance. Although innovative, and crucially present in 
most books of the industrial revolution, the sectors of coal, iron and steel yet accounted for 
only little of the estimated productivity growth.     
 
Table 1: Sources of Industrial Revolution Efficiency Advance in England, 1780s-1860s 
Sector Efficiency Growth Rate (%) 
Contribution to National Efficiency  
Growth Rate (% per year) 
All Textiles 2.3 0.25 
Iron and Steel 1.8 0.02 
Coal Mining 0.2 0.00 
Transport 1.5 0.12 
Agriculture 0.4 0.11 
   Identified Advance   0.49 
   Whole Economy   0.58 
 




Why did the industrial revolution happen? Formulated in such a way, the question is pretty 
unanswerable. That’s why researchers have increasingly dealt with more focused versions of 
this question (Mokyr, 1999). Examples are: Why did the industrial revolution start in Britain 
and not elsewhere, for instance in the wealthy Dutch Republic or in France? Why did the 
British industrial revolution eventually break out in the late 18th century and not before? 
Why was the industrial revolution a European (or a North Atlantic) phenomenon? Why did 
the industrial revolution take place in Northwest Europe and not in East Asia, two regions 
that seemingly were equally advanced when going into the 18th century? Is it possible to 
define some necessary preconditions for the industrialization to have occurred? If these 
questions share similar arguments, they obviously also call for specific answers. In particular, 
all the economically successful countries did not follow the same industrialization path. Each 
national experience was unique. The uniqueness of the British experience came partly from 
its precocity. As it was the first country to undergo an industrial revolution, Britain presents 
in some way the “purest” case of rapid industrialization.  
 
In this paper, we carry out an economic survey on the literature devoted to identifying the 
causes of the British industrialization. What are the main factors which have been advanced 
to explain why Britain was the first country to experience a successful industrial revolution 
that eventually turned into modern economic growth, thus writing the first lines of a new 
page in the world economic history book? If some of these factors are specific to Britain’s 
economy and society and rather help to understand why Britain came to take the lead in the 
industrial revolution, others can be directly extended to the European level and then help to 
understand why the industrial revolution was in fine a European (North Atlantic) event. This 
economic survey, which aims at updating and completing Mokyr (1999)’s previous survey, 
also spends time emphasizing the main points of criticism that have been directed to the 
proposed causes of the British industrial revolution. As this survey is not part of a new book 
coming up with a new explanation of the British industrial revolution, it deliberately has the 
feature of being neutral, thus giving the same amount of credit to each theory. In light of the 
different arguments and criticisms, the reader is invited to forge his own interpretation of 
the British industrial revolution. A major challenge facing the literature on the causes of the 
British and European industrialization is the lack of reliable and generally recognized data on 
the period under investigation. Most data, especially economic data, are based on estimates 
and assumptions which are far from being consensual. Conflictual estimates thus make the 
debate sometimes hard to follow, at times giving credit to one specific theory and at times 
dismissing it. To keep things as clear as possible, we choose, as part of this survey, not to go 
too deeply into the statistical debate, although we will provide data supporting the different 
theories with parsimony. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sheds light on a new 
rising debate on the evolution of the British and European economy in the centuries before 
the industrial revolution, and on the economic forced behind this evolution. Was Britain 
trapped in Malthusian dynamics or already launched on a progressive path towards modern 
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growth? Section 3 constitutes the core of this paper. It provides and develops an important 
but non exhaustive list of the main causes of the British industrial revolution proposed in the 
literature. These causes are aggregated into seven broad categories: geography and natural 
resources; demography; agricultural progress; demand-side factors; trade and empire; 
institutional and political factors; science, technology, and human capital2. A final section 
gives some concluding thoughts and remarks.    
      
2. Before the industrial revolution 
 
There is a rising debate in the literature concerning the evolution of the British income per 
capita and real wages prior to the industrial revolution. While the industrial revolution has 
long been seen as the key break in world economic history, characterizing the passage from 
Malthusian societies to modern ones, as well as the appearance of what Huntington (1996) 
called a “Great Divergence” between the successful Western countries and the rest of the 
world, a new view has recently emerged to support the idea of a “Little Divergence” taking 
place during the centuries preceding the industrial revolution. Clark (2011, 2012a) makes 
reference to these competing views as a new debate between “Malthus” and the “revolt of 
the early modernists3” (Nuvolari and Ricci, 2013). The Malthusian view, notably adhered to 
by the California School world historians, considers that all economies were trapped in 
Malthusian dynamics before the industrial revolution. Income per capita fluctuated around a 
subsistence level - defined as the level of income at which birth and death rates are equal 
(Nuvolari and Ricci, 2013) -, but exhibited almost no upward trend, an evolution Persson 
(2008) describes as “the Malthus delusion”. Thus, Clark (2007a, 2010a, 2012 and 2013)4 has 
repeatedly affirmed that the English income per capita in 1800 was not higher on average 
than in most of its history since 1200, and even more surprisingly since as far back as the 
hunter-gatherer era. In line with the Malthusian view, many scholars have defended that 
Europe, compared with other civilizations, did not enjoy any economic advantage in terms of 
living standards and income per capita when breaking into the 18th century. In parallel, a lot 
of studies have shown that other parts of the world, especially East Asia, seemingly shared a 
number of characteristics with Britain and Europe’s economy and society in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, like long-distance trade, secure contracts and property rights, or consumption 
habits, and were more advanced in certain areas (see e.g. Wong, 1997; Li, 1998; Pomeranz 
2000; Vries, 2003; Parthasarathi, 2011; Goldstone, 2002, 2008 and 2012) (Goldstone, 2015). 
The alternative view, strongly defended by the “early modernists”, contends that Europe 
was already progressive, both intellectually and technically, since the Middle Age, or at least 
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the Renaissance, making significant advances in areas such as architecture, manufacturing, 
exploration, shipbuilding, navigation, agriculture and science, a situation often described as 
the “Rise of the West” which would accordingly have contrasted with the stagnation of the 
other civilizations (Goldstone, 2015). From a pure macroeconomic point of view, the early 
modernists have detected a small but steady acceleration of growth in Northwest Europe, at 
least in two countries, namely England and the Netherlands, before the industrial revolution 
(see e.g. Wrigley, 1985; van Zanden, 2002; Broadberry and Bishnupriya, 2006; Allen, 2008a; 
de Vries, 2008; Maddison, 2008; Persson, 2008; van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2011, 2012; 
Broadberry et al., 2011, 2015; Nuvolari and Ricci, 2013; Broadberry, 2014; Broadberry, Guan 
and Li, 2014; Bolt and Van Zanden, 2014; Broadberry, Custodis and Gupta, 2015). Broadberry 
et al. (2011, 2015)’s estimates, built on an output-based approach, thus show a persistent 
upward trend in GDP per capita which would have doubled between 1270 and 17005. By use 
of a demand-side approach, Nuvolari and Ricci (2013) find that the English economy was 
rather “Malthusian” between 1250 and 1580, then showed capacity to relax some of the 
Malthusian constraints between 1580 and 1780, achieving a positive growth rate, although 
lower than those suggested by Maddison (2008) and Broadberry et al. (2011, 2015). Besides 
the construction of historical national accounts tracing the evolution of GDP per capita in 
Northwestern Europe and other regions of the world, a number of studies have also been 
produced to estimate preindustrial wages and thus check more precisely the hypothesis of 
“Little Divergence” of living standards across societies before the industrial revolution (see 
e.g. Allen, 2001, 2005a and 2009a; van Zanden, 2005a; Broadberry and Bishnupriya, 2006; 
Clark, 2007b; Hersh and Voth, 2009; Pamuk and van Zanden 2010; Allen, Bassino et al., 2011; 
Allen, Murphy et al., 2012) (Goldstone, 2015). According to the early modernists, the “Great 
Divergence” between Europe and Asia would thus root in a “Little Divergence” occurring 
during the centuries preceding the industrial revolution (Broadberry, 2014). By extension, a 
number of scholars have suggested to locate the origins of the industrial revolution and 
modern economic growth in this “Little Divergence” process, arguing that an initial rise in 
per capita income was crucial for the transition to industrialized society6 and modern growth 
(see e.g. Galor and Weil, 2000; Hansen and Prescott, 2002) (Voigtlander and Voth, 2013b). 
Accounting for the “Little Divergence” has become a challenge for the early modernists. 
Testing a number of various hypotheses about the causes of the “Little Divergence” within 
Europe, de Pleijt and van Zanden (2013) have recently found that institutional changes, 
especially the rise of active Parliaments, and human capital formation were the primary 
drivers of the economic growth that took place in the North Sea Area of Europe between 
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1300 and 18007. Moreover, the study suggests that religion, i.e. the spread of Protestantism, 
might have played a key role as it affected human capital formation. These results highly 
contrast with previous Allen (2003)’s simulations, who reached the conclusion that the main 
factors responsible for the economic success in Northwestern Europe were the growth of 
American and Asian commerce and, especially, the innovations underlying the export of the 
new draperies in the 16th and 17th centuries, while the famous enclosures of the open fields, 
the representative government, and the spread of literacy – and so human capital - were 
relatively unimportant. In a recent paper, Broadberry (2014) has summarized the potential 
causes of the North Sea Area success already advanced in the literature. Among others, 
Broadberry highlights the role of the long trade distance, especially through its interaction 
with the institutions, the pastoral farming, and more generally the agricultural changes, the 
consumer preferences, the attitudes to work, and some demographic factors, in particular 
the European Marriage Pattern, which would have contributed to reducing fertility below 
the biological maximum, thus increasing the opportunities of investment in human capital 
(see e.g. Greif, 2006a; Foreman-Peck, 2011) and improving women’s participation in the 
labor force (see e.g. de Moor, 2008; de Moor and van Zanden, 2010; Voigtlander and Voth, 
2013a).  
 
Did “Little Divergence” prefigure modern growth in the Western World? This question has 
been increasingly debated in the literature. While some scholars have positioned themselves 
in favor of a growth led - at least partly - by technological change and improvements in TFP 
(see e.g. van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2011, 2012, Moller and sharp, 2014)8, others have 
highlighted Malthusian mechanisms - changes of the birth and death schedules - to account 
for the increase in income per capita observed in preindustrial Western Europe. In a paper 
ironically entitled “Malthusian Dynamism and the Rise of Europe: Make War, Not Love”, 
Voigtlander and Voth (2009) thus claimed that two European “inventions”, namely a peculiar 
marriage pattern and a specific mortality regime, might account for the increase in incomes 
observed between 1300 and 1800. Reasserting that productivity growth played only a little 
role in the evolution of the British and European GDP per capita between 1350 and 1700, 
Voigtlander and Voth (2013b) later developed a neo-Malthusian model with two sectors and 
multiple steady states to explain the rise in income per capita and urbanization during this 
period in Europe. The authors notably showed that a negative shock to population size - as 
the Black Death was (see also Pamuk, 2007) - might have triggered some of the demographic 
changes observed in the preindustrial period as it increased not only the real wages, but also 
(because of the supposed Engel law) the size of the cities - characterized by higher death 
rates - where the urban goods (the superior ones) were produced. Higher wages moreover 
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allowed higher levels of taxes, most of which were aimed at financing wars, whose effects on 
population size were negative. In the model, the increase in the death schedule induced by 
the initial shock on population size and the higher wages - a relation labelled the “horsemen 
effect”9 - contributes to reducing the population pressure and makes higher equilibrium 
incomes sustainable. The idea that Malthusian population dynamics can raise the individual 
incomes in a subsistence economy and account for the widely accepted view that Western 
Europe was richer than Asia well before 1800 has been shared by several other scholars (see 
e.g. Clark, 2007a; Clark, 2008; Clark and Cummins, 2009; Clark, Cummins and Smith, 2012; 
Sharp et al., 2012). Thinking about the true onset of modern economic growth, Goldstone 
(2015) has also recently dismissed the idea of a “Little Divergence” launch pad for modern 
economic growth, arguing that a closer examination of the recent GDP per capita series 
reveals a pattern typical of pre-modern “efflorescences” in Britain and Holland, just as had 
occurred in earlier efflorescences in Song China and Renaissance Italy. As Goldstone (2015:1) 
wrote: “According to the new data, at no point after 1600 and before 1780 did any nation in 
Europe experience both significant population growth and significant per capita income 
growth, as would be necessary for modern economic growth to have emerged. The new 
GDP/capita data make it clear that in fact China and Europe – both in their leading regions 
and overall – were on very similar economic trajectories until after 1800 […] Modern 
economic growth arose only in a late “Great Divergence” after 1800”. In Goldstone (2015)’s 
terms, something special happened to the British economy around 1800. This view is close 
to the one of Clark (2014) who strongly believes that the British industrial revolution was a 
singularity, a unique break in the world economic history.  
 
3. The causes of the industrial revolution 
 
The first waves of studies on the industrial revolution mainly sought to identify its social and 
economic effects: industrial production growth, development of cities, rise of the factory 
system, emergence of new social classes, etc. They highlighted the crucial role of technical 
progress in destabilizing the preindustrial societies but did not take a lot of effort to analyze 
the conditions underlying the appearance of the industrial revolution. The work of Mantoux 
(1906), one of the first historical syntheses of the British industrial revolution, was typical of 
this approach (Rioux, 1971). By contrast, the economic historian Ashton (1948) relegated the 
technological inventions to a lower level of priority, arguing that they were essential but 
could not emerge, bloom, and launch a process of modernization and sustained efficiency 
advance out of a favorable environment. As Mokyr (1999:12) claimed: “Inventions do not 
rain down upon an economy like manna from heaven. They are stimulated by economic and 
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social pre-existing conditions. They emerge in the minds of some people for some reason 
which may or may not be identified, are communicated, adapted, refined, implemented, and 
imitated”. In The stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto, Rostow (1960) 
proposed a development model defining five chronological development stages: traditional 
society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity and high consumption mass. 
This model has been heavily criticized, especially for its extreme linearity and its attempt to 
draw a universal model of development based on the unique Western World experience. 
Nevertheless, the model had the merit to rehash and intensify the debate around the idea of 
preconditions for take-off. The researchers have increasingly been interested in discovering 
these preconditions, or less restrictively the factors that favored the industrial revolution in 
Britain and Europe. This question has received much attention not just from historians and 
economic historians, but also from development economists who have viewed in the deep 
understanding of the industrial revolution the opportunity to design development policies in 
poor countries. The goal of this section is to carry out a survey of the main factors which 
have been advanced in the literature to explain why Britain was the first country to undergo 
a successful industrial revolution. As a preamble, it is worth noting that the notion that some 
factors were really indispensable for the industrial revolution has become increasingly hard 
to defend (Gerschenkron, 1962). As Mokyr (1999:19) brightly wrote: Some factors present in 
Britain facilitated the Industrial Revolution and in this sense can be said to be causal. Others 
impeded its progress, and the Industrial Revolution proceeded in spite of them. The term 
‘facilitated’ does not mean, however, that there were any elements that were indispensable. 
After all, factors that were neither necessary nor sufficient for the outcome can still be 
thought of as causal. For instance, heart attacks cause deaths, though not all deaths are 
caused by them and not all heart attacks are fatal. Moreover, insofar as heart attacks are 
themselves caused by other factors, it is debatable to what extent they are really ultimate 
causes or just ‘transmission mechanisms’. The causal explanation of the industrial revolution 
runs into similar quandaries”.  
 
A number of scholars have proposed to distinguish between the “proximate” explanations of 
the industrial revolution, those which themselves call for an explanation, and the “ultimate” 
causes of the industrial revolution, those associated with some “supposed” exogenous shock 
that could potentially account for the subsequent economic, political, social, and cultural 
changes that eventually led to the appearance of the industrial revolution (Cordoba, 2007). 
In the quest for the ultimate causes of the industrial revolution, some scholars have thus 
located the roots of this economic event into the English Glorious Revolution in 1688 (see 
e.g. North and Weingast 1989; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), the scientific revolution of 
the 16th and 17th centuries (see e.g. Musson and Robinson, 1969; Mokyr, 2005a, 2010a;  
Jacob, 1997, 2007 and 2014), the Great Discoveries at the end of the 15th century (see e.g. 
Acemoglu et al., 2005b; Cordoba, 2007) or even well back into the medieval times (see e.g. 
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Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007; van Zanden, 200810). By contrast, one very typical example of a 
proximate explanation of the British industrial revolution is the theory developed by Bairoch 
(1963) in his thesis entitled Révolution industrielle et sous-développement. According to this 
Belgian economic historian, the British industrial revolution was caused, at least partly, by 
the British agricultural revolution that supposedly took place a bit before and during the 
industrial revolution. In line with Bairoch’s view, agricultural progress was a sine qua non 
condition for British take-off as the modernization of the British agriculture seemingly was 
the only way to free up the economic resources, namely the labor and the capital, needed 
for the large-scale industrial development. Furthermore, the demand for industrial products 
coming from the changing agriculture would have provided the necessary stimuli to the 
British industry. But how could one explain agricultural progress without shedding light on 
some other factors?  
 
According to Clark (2003:14), any convincing explanation of the British Industrial Revolution 
necessarily has to do with the following things. “First explain why no society before 1800 - 
not ancient Babylon, Pharaonic Egypt, China through countless centuries, Classical Greece, 
Imperial Rome, Renaissance Tuscany, medieval  Flanders, the Aztecs, Mogul India, the Dutch 
Republic - expanded the stock of knowledge by  more than 10% a century. Then explain why 
within 50 years of 1800 the rate of growth of knowledge rose to modern rates in one small 
country on the margins of Europe, Britain. And of course explain why economies around the 
world have benefited from this knowledge expansion to such different degrees. Then we will 
understand the history of man. Classifying the existing theories of the industrial revolution, 
Clark (2003) distinguished between the “exogenous growth theories”, those which contend 
that exogenous events created the conditions needed for the industrial revolution to have 
taken place, the “multiple equilibrium theories”, those which argue that a shock (disease, 
war, and so on) led the economy to move from the Malthusian equilibrium to the dynamic 
equilibrium, and the “endogenous growth theories”, according to which the industrialization 
was written into the humanity’s genetic code, i.e. dependent on the evolution of a state 
variable11 which, beyond a certain critical threshold, triggered a new process of sustained 
efficiency advance. Aware of the huge complexity of the causal mechanisms at work in the 
appearance of the British industrial revolution, Mokyr (1999:19) strongly advocated in favor 
of “positive feedback and interactive path-dependent models”, arguing that the monocausal, 
linear models based on concepts of equilibrium or steady states have huge difficulty doing 
justice to the historical reality. In Mokyr (2005b:288)’s terms, a satisfactory account of the 
industrial revolution has to deal with the following question: “If technology was at the heart 
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of the Industrial Revolution, why was it changing at a rate more rapid and on a scale more 
widespread than ever before, and why did it accelerate in the nineteenth century instead of 
fizzle out?”12 With perhaps the exception of those scholars attributing a quite important role 
to luck in the British industrial revolution (see e.g. Crafts, 1985b), economic historians have 
increasingly accepted the idea that the industrial revolution took place in 18th century Britain 
because a package of technological inventions came up to form a new “technical system” 
(Gille, 1978) in a quite favorable environment. For that reason, we need to observe the 
characteristics of the national and international environment in which Britain successfully 
undertook an industrial revolution. 
 
a) Geography and natural resources  
 
Britain’s geography and geological conditions have often been highlighted to explain British 
economic success after 1750. Surrounded by sea, crisscrossed by rivers and penetrated by 
large estuaries, Britain, whose territory is characterized by the fact that no one place is more 
than 120 km far away from the nearest coast, benefited from advantageous geographical 
conditions for water transport. In addition to giving easy access to a relatively cheap and 
convenient transportation mode, which early stimulated the exchanges between the main 
British ports and coastal regions, the sea moreover constituted a natural barrier that likely 
dissuaded potential enemies from invading the country, thus contributing to maintain some 
relative peace and stability on the British ground. By the late 18th century, Britain had not 
been successfully attacked since 1066 and the great Norman invasion (Mokyr, 1999). Being 
an island might also have provided Britain with incentives to develop and permanently 
improve the navigation techniques that translated into British maritime superiority as from 
the end of the 17th century. Maritime power helped Britain to defend its territory, to win 
commercial wars, and to play an important role in international trade which contributed to 
stimulating the British industry. Along with some privileged geographical situation, Britain 
also supposedly enjoyed favorable geological conditions. Not only had the country abundant 
natural resources such as iron and non-ferrous metals (copper, zinc and lead, etc.), but also 
“England was built upon an underground mountain of coal” (Levine, 1987:97). Introduced on 
a large scale into the British economy to overcome the expected shortage of timber - Britain 
was one of the least wooded European countries - and meet the new fuel needs of the 
improving technology of transporting (Mokyr, 2010a), coal provided Britain access to huge 
quantities of cheap and powerful energy, especially as British coal was easily mined then 
transported by waterways.  
 
                                                          
12
 Crafts (1995, 1996) stated the central question associated with the industrial revolution in very similar terms. 
11 
 
The impact of natural factors on the economic inequalities among countries has always been 
subject to a large debate in the literature. If some scholars have given to such “accidents of 
nature” a quite determining role, others have tended to nuance them. It’s nowadays widely 
accepted that Britain truly took advantage of its geographical environment to design its own 
industrialization path. Britain’s access to relatively cheap water transport thus favored the 
adoption of coal on a large scale, the development of some specific industries, contributed 
to “crack open” local monopolies protected by high transport-cost barriers (Mathias, 1969), 
and promoted foreign trade. It has also been defended that the favorable water transport 
conditions in Britain helped the country to meet some of the necessary preconditions for 
take-off identified by Rostow (1960), especially the ones related to transport. But was really 
the British industrial revolution dependent on geographical factors? Tackling this question, 
Deane (1965, p.76) moderately wrote: ”If Britain had had to depend on her roads to carry her 
heavy goods traffic the effective impact of the industrial revolution may well have been 
delayed until the railway age”. The exact role of the British natural resources, especially the 
abundant presence of coal, has also been greatly discussed among scholars. Wrigley (1962) 
thus claimed that the substitution of inorganic material and fuels for the previously inorganic 
sources of raw material and power (wood and animal power), a phenomenon emphasized by 
other scholars (see e.g. Landes, 2003, Wrigley, 2004, 2010), was a sine qua non to take-off 
and industrial growth. Tracing the history of the coal industry, Church (1986:758) stated that 
“it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of coal to the British economy”, summarizing the 
thought of several generations of (economic) historians (see e.g. Clapham, 1926; Nef, 1932; 
Ashton, 1948; Deane, 1965; Braudel, 1981)13 who placed coal at the heart of the story of the 
industrial revolution. Quite in the same vein, Sieferle (2001) argued that the early use of 
fossil energy in Britain, due to the rarefaction of British wood, explained why this country 
undertook first an industrial revolution. By contrast, Germany, a country characterized by 
the presence of large wooded areas located next to rivers, remained longer dependent on a 
traditional energy regime. Pomeranz (2000) also attributed the British economic success to 
the accessible reserves of mineral resources, especially coal, near population centers. In line 
with this view, Ridley (2010a, 2010b) identified coal as the material account for the British 
industrial revolution and the subsequent modern economic growth: “without coal, Britain 
would be just another flash in the pan, a golden age that produced some luxury and culture 
and science but no real transformation of living standards”. Several “cliometric” studies (see 
e.g. McCloskey, 1981; Crafts, 1985a, Mokyr, 1990; Crafts and Harley, 1992; Clark and Jacks, 
2007) have yet tended to seriously downplay the role played, directly or indirectly, by coal 
and the coal industry in British industrialization (Clark and Jacks, 2007). Based on historical 
coal rent series, Clark and Jacks (2007) have thus found that the English possession of coal 
reserves actually made a negligible contribution to industrial revolution incomes. Relying on 
Kanefsky (1979) and Crafts (2004)’s estimates, O Grada (2014a:12) reaches the conclusion 
that “steam’s - and so coal’s – role at the height of the industrial revolution, both as a source 
of energy relative to waterpower and in terms of its contribution to overall economic growth, 
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was distinctly secondary”. In the same vein, Mokyr (2010a:101) stated that “besides steam 
engines and iron smelting and processing, radical new uses for coal during the industrial 
revolution were not that many”. Although being one defender of the materialist approach, 
Clark (2010b:1) sustained that coal was the “wrong materialism” and could not account for 
the upturn in innovative activity during the industrial revolution: “Without a single ton of 
coal being dug from the ground in England 1760-1860 there would still have been an 
industrial revolution”. Clark (2010b) defended his position by notably showing that coal did 
not prove to be essential for the textile inventions, the transport infrastructure, and the 
improvements in sailing ships. Testing various accounts of the British industrial revolution in 
the framework of a simple dynamic model, Borowiecky and Tepper (2015) also very recently 
concluded that coal played a minor role in the British breakout from Malthusian dynamics.  
 
In reality, it’s highly difficult to assess the exact role of coal in the British industrialization. In 
particular, it is not clear how resource availability plays on technological progress (Mokyr, 
1999). On the one hand, resource abundance is often seen as fortunate as it reduces the 
production costs and makes potentially viable the expansion of a whole “technical system” 
(Gille, 1978) based on its large-scale industrial use. On the other hand, resource scarcity is 
also likely to encourage creativity and innovation by imposing some stimulating challenges 
to the economy. Mokyr (1990:160) thus noted: “In the absence of coal, the ingenuity applied 
to using it would have been directed towards replacing it”. In his recent book entitled The 
Enlightened Economy, Mokyr (2010a:101-102) reaffirmed his position, contending that ”the 
industrial revolution didn’t absolutely need steam…, nor was steam power absolutely 
dependent on coal”. According to this view, coal wasn’t a driver for technological progress. It 
truly shaped the British industrial revolution but did not create it. Resources endowments, 
as well as demand factors, would then work as a “steering mechanism”, or what Rosenberg 
(1969) called a “focusing device”, leading to a national bias in technological activity (Kuznets, 
1965). “Thus, coal-rich Britain focused on Newcomen engines, while coal-poor Switzerland 
found economic success in precision-intensive low-energy industries such as watchmaking 
and engineering”14. Britain’s technological creativity, defined as its ability to develop new 
inventions and adapt them to its highest benefit, would so have been much more crucial. Yet 
it might still be argued that Britain’s particular advantage in producing economically valuable 
inventions was partly due to the presence of natural resources and coal on its territory. For 
instance, the extraction of coal, through mining activities, induced the invention of the high-
potential steam engine which was later implemented with success in other industries like 
the textiles and the metallurgy. In reality, at the times of the British industrial revolution, we 
do not know whether the industrial world opened by coal and its large-scale exploitation 
was more promising than the one that would have possibly emerged in the absence of coal 
resources. Whatever their exact role in the British industrial revolution, the geographical and 
geological factors, like most other causal factors proposed in the abundant literature, were 
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hardly either necessary or sufficient (Mokyr, 1999). As Britain, Ireland and Japan are also 
islands. Britain and France, based on Verley (1997)’s calculations, had comparable amounts 
of naturally navigable rivers. The United Provinces of the Netherlands also enjoyed good 
conditions for internal transportation (Mokyr, 1999, 2000a) and furthermore had virtually 
access to cheap coal which was not a British monopoly (Clark, 2010b). China, Russia and the 
United states possessed huge reserves of coal on their territories. And coal was anyway a 
traded commodity. International trade could theoretically absorb, at least partly, national 
inequalities in natural endowments. This argument, among others, led Mokyr (1980, 1985) 
to discredit the notion that pre-famine Ireland failed to industrialize because of a lack of 
readily available coal.  
 
As for Britain, similar factors, based on geographical and geological conditions, have often 
been advanced in the literature to explain the “Great Divergence” between Europe and the 
rest of the world, and especially East Asia. For instance, Diamond (1997) pointed out the 
relatively high number of kilometers of coastline (per square kilometer of surface) which 
Europe is endowed with, compared to other regions in the world. According to this author, 
this privileged access to sea and the Atlantic favored international trade and the subsequent 
accumulation of wealth in the Western European countries. In his book entitled The great 
divergence, Pomeranz (2000) contended that Europe’s divergence from the Old World was 
largely the consequence of the fortunate location of coal, which progressively substituted for 
timber in Europe, and trade with the Americas. In a critical review of the book, Vries (2001) 
summarized Pomeranz’s account of the European industrial revolution using the expression 
“Coal and colonies”. In agreement with Sachs and Warner (1997)’s proposal that biological 
and geographical factors can affect the rates of technological change and economic growth, 
Abramson and Boix (2014) argued that the good climate and quality of soil in Europe might 
have affected positively the agricultural yields, thus spurring both population growth and 
urbanization. According to these authors, the access to the Atlantic, through foreign trade, 
also contributed to fostering the development of urban agglomerations15. The cities, in turn, 
supposedly provided an environment conducive to technological progress, and especially to 
labor-saving technological inventions (see e.g. Habakkuk, 1962; Allen, 2009b, 2010). Without 
stating any opinion on whether coal played a causal role in the European industrialization, 
Fernihough and O’Rourke (2014) have incidentally shown that coal was a strong determinant 
of the city population size, accounting for around 60% of the growth in the European city 
populations between 1750 and 1900. 
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An original feature of the 18th century is the evolution of the number of men in Britain and 
Europe (Habakkuk, 1953). Indeed, a sustained growth of the European population started as 
from the beginning of what Michelet called the “Great century”. Many authors have seen in 
this demographic expansion the signs of the final victory of life. Between 1000 and 1700, the 
European population (including Russia) rose from 43 million to 125 million of individuals 
(Biraben, 2003). This evolution corresponded to an average annual growth rate of around 
0.15%. Over this period, different phases of demographic crisis and growth followed each 
other. The phases of demographic growth were often observed in times of relative peace 
and political stability, and modest economic development. The phases of demographic crises 
resulted above all from the three misfortunes - also labelled the “three horsemen of the 
Apocalypse” or the “three mortal fates” (Sauvy, 1963) - of those times, i.e. the epidemics, 
the wars and the famine, which hit cyclically the European populations. If the diseases 
(smallpox, dysentery, plague, etc.) and the wars (Hundred Years War, Thirty Years War, 
Dutch war, Anglo-Dutch war, etc.) had quite terrible devastating effects, the most frequent 
demographic disaster was likely the dearth (Desaive et al., 1972). After a poor harvest, due 
for instance to catastrophic weather conditions, the food products, especially the cereals, 
became scarce and so highly expensive, leading to an increase in mortality rates. Against the 
backdrop of any demographic analysis, it is very important to keep in mind that agricultural 
performance was a crucial element influencing both food safety and mortality. The 17th 
century was characterized by a stagnation of the European population, accompanied with 
dramatic periods of demographic decline in some countries such as Germany, North Italy, 
Spain and France (Verley, 1997). But everything changed starting from the end of the 17th 
century in Britain, and a bit later in the rest of Western Europe, where a process of sustained 
demographic growth progressively took shape (Flinn, 1970, 1981). Between 1700 and 1800, 
the European population indeed rose from 125 million to 195 million of individuals (Biraben, 
2003). In reality, the acceleration of the population growth really took place in the second 
half of the 18th century. The French population increased by slightly more than 7 million of 
individuals between 1700 and 1789, amounting around 28 million of citizens on the eve of 
the French Revolution (Dupaquier, 1988). In one single century, i.e. between 1710 and 1810, 
the population almost doubled in England (Wrigley and Schofield, 1981; Clark, 2010a). It also 
increased dramatically in countries such as Ireland, Germany, Russia, Italy, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, pushing the European nations to introduce or generalize the official censuses 
intended to collect data and information about population. Although the question is still 
largely debated in the literature, the growth of the British population in the 18th century 
seems to have been the combined result of a rise in the crude birth rate and a fall in the 
crude death rate (Wrigley and Schofield, 1981; cited in Galor, 2005:226). Besides the general 
rise in the European population, Kelly and O Grada (2014a) pointed out great demographic 
differences among European countries. For instance, life expectancy at birth in England was 
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higher than in France at dawn of the industrial revolution16. As Kelly and O Grada (2014a:14-
15) noted, “true, the gap was largely due to lower infant and child mortality, but this still 
means that survivors of childhood in England were less likely to be scarred by disease than 
their French counterparts, with attendant advantages in adult height and health. Recent 
research on the impact of adverse shocks (e.g. being conceived or born during a famine) or 
pro-active interventions in utero and during early childhood (e.g. better medical care and 
nutrition) points to significant long-term implications for adult physical and mental health 
and, indeed, also cognitive penalties (e.g. Malucio et al., 2009; Hatton, 2011; Barham et al., 
2013; Currie and Vogl, 2013). Surely it is not implausible to extend that link to the past?” 
 
A number of scholars (see e.g. Deane and Cole, 1962; John, 1965; Eversley, 1967; Perkin, 
1969; McKendrick et al., 1983) have emphasized demographic expansion as a factor likely to 
explain the timing of the British industrialization. The Economics Nobelist Hicks (1939:302) 
even suggested that “perhaps the whole industrial revolution of the last two hundred years 
has been nothing else but a vast secular boom, largely induced by the unparalleled rise in the 
population”. Taking a more cautious position, other scholars have argued that population 
growth contributed significantly to economic changes in Britain (e.g. Habakkuk, 1971; Lee 
and Schofield, 1981). By contrast, only a few continental scholars have paid great deal of 
attention to the economic consequences of population expansion (Anderson, 1996). The 
proponents of the demographic account have highlighted both demand and supply factors 
to define the various channels through which population growth might have triggered or 
spurred a process of industrialization. On the demand side, the demographic expansion 
increased the total volume of desired goods and services in the economy and so would have 
made necessary the emergence of a new economic growth based on technical progress. An 
alternative demand-side view contends that the rise in demand (larger consumption market) 
would have fostered both investment and innovation by creating a much less risky business 
environment for entrepreneurs and modifying their expectations. This refers to the typical 
Keynesian argument (Anderson, 1996). On the supply side, population growth potentially 
raised the number of available workers, and thus would have contributed to reducing wages, 
as well as some economically harmful rigidities in the labor market. This, in turn, would have 
promoted new entrepreneurial ventures and innovative activities. Moreover, population 
growth would have guaranteed the presence of readily available workers for the industrial 
development. Some scholars such as North and Thomas (1973) have also shed light on the 
potential effects of the population pressure on the development of new growth-friendly 
institutions (secure property rights, etc.). 
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Although appealing at first glance, some major criticisms can be addressed to this quite 
simple determinist view of the relation between population growth and industrialization. 
Population growth was not an invention of the 18th century. Some episodes of demographic 
expansion had already previously occurred in Britain and Europe without creating anything 
that looks like an industrial revolution. Furthermore, Europe was not the only region in the 
world to exhibit a population growth in 18th century. Other regions, such as China and 
Central America, were also growing in population. Why did not these regions take off? The 
current experience of the Third-World nations, although it truly takes place in a radically 
different world, also tends to prove that an acceleration of the population growth is not 
enough to set into motion a cumulative process of industrial growth. Population growth was 
not a sufficient condition, especially as the potential relation between demography and 
industrialization was, at best, an indirect one. The increase in the total volume of desired 
goods and services arguably induced by the population growth couldn’t indeed translate into 
effective demand for manufactured goods and economic growth per capita without supply-
side adjustments and technical progress (for instance in agriculture) capable of providing the 
extra population with new resources and thus overcoming the propensity for the marginal 
productivity of labor to fall (see e.g. Wrigley and Schofield, 1981:443-449; O’Brien, 1985:786; 
Hudson, 1992:160; Anderson, 1996:267). But, as Anderson (1996:267) noted, “there is no 
theoretical reason why population pressure should induce these. Indeed, in the alternative 
way, it was only because they were taking place anyway that population growth could 
continue”. Using a technologically static model in which capital and land are assumed to be 
constant, Mokyr (1985) estimated that population growth could not account for more than 
10% of the rise in the industrial output between 1750 and 1850. However, the model fails to 
take into account different elements including the Keynesian argument, that is the potential 
positive effect of population growth on the return to capital, for instance in house building 
and transport, and so on investment and innovation (More, 2000). The scholars who locate 
population growth at the heart of the story of the industrial revolution actually have to make 
recourse to some dynamic argument that explicitly links the population size or growth and 
technological change or productivity growth (Boserup, 1981: cited in Mokyr, 1985). This idea 
of induced innovation17, although it has been formalized by several scholars (see e.g. Becker 
et al., 1990; Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Kremer, 
1993; Kortum, 1997; Segerstrom, 1998; Galor and Weil, 2000; Kögel and Prskawetz, 2001; 
Jones, 1995a, 2001; Galor, 2005, 2011), is far from being uncontroversial (see Jones, 1995b; 
Voth, 2003; Mokyr, 2005c; Lagerlof, 2006; Clark, 2003, 2005a, 2014). Not only the effect of 
population growth on demand and technical progress, but also the widespread idea that 
demographic growth encouraged labor mobility and provided the expanding industry with 
readily available workers has been greatly challenged in the literature. Many scholars have 
notably argued that the labor mobility remained low by those times, both sectorally and 
geographically (compare Wallis, 2014). Additionally, the industrial use of the workforce was 
not determined by the overall demographic conditions, but rather by both the sectoral and 
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regional characteristics of the labor markets. The rural overpopulation in Britain in the first 
half of the 19th century was thus not incompatible with the fact that entrepreneurs, at least 
in some regions and/or sectors, had strong difficulties in recruiting skilled workers (Verley, 
1997). According to Drake (1969), the British industrialization, at least before 1815, did not 
contribute to use an excess additional workforce. It might even be that the British industry 
innovated to compensate for the shortage of skilled workers. This point introduces the two 
competing and incompatible views of the role of labor in the British industrial revolution (see 
e.g. Mokyr, 1999; Wallis, 2014). The first one, closely associated to Habakkuk (1962)’s work, 
considers technology as the enterprise’s response to labor scarcity. Labor scarcity - and the 
resulting high wages - was so friendly to industrial growth as it induced the introduction of 
labor-saving technologies18. If some scholars have indeed acknowledged the existence of 
labor shortage in some British counties such as Lancashire (see e.g. Anderson, 1996), others 
have rejected the evidence of any labor scarcity in Britain (see e.g. Flinn, 1966). The second 
view, based on what Mokyr (1976) called the growing-up models, suggests that industrial 
progress was more likely to happen in areas in which labor, considered as a scarce resource, 
was abundant and cheap (see e.g. Lewis, 1954; Pollard, 1978)1920.  
 
Developing around the idea that modern economic growth emerged as the result of a close 
interplay between demographic and economic changes, a highly-influential literature has 
increasingly tried to provide theories able to explain both the economic and demographic 
transitions within the same framework. These unified growth theories seek to account for 
the passage from a Malthusian regime to a modern growth regime (economic transition), as 
well as for the underlying causes of the decline in the fertility rates (demographic transition). 
The industrial revolution and the demographic transition are then seen as different aspects 
of a single economic event (Lucas, 2002). In these growth models, much of the economic 
acceleration goes through the fall in fertility and the increase in educational standards, i.e. 
the accumulation of human capital (see e.g. Galor, 2005; Clark, 2014). Possible mechanisms 
for generating a drop in fertility and a progressive switch to sustained modern growth are, 
among others, the exogenous technological progress (see e.g. Greenwood and Seshadri, 
2002), the institutional change (see e.g. Jones, 2001), changing marriage institutions  (see 
e.g. Gould et al., 2008), the introduction of new contraceptive technologies (see e.g. Strulik, 
2014), the compulsory schooling (see e.g. Sugimoto and Nakagawa, 2010), increasing basic 
knowledge (see e.g. O’Rourke et al., 2013), structural change associated with an increasing 
share of population investing into education (see e.g. Doepke, 2004), the natural selection 
favoring the parents with higher preference for educated children (see e.g. Galor and Moav, 
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2002)21, rising time cost of raising children (see e.g. Lagerlof, 2003, Hazan and Berdugo, 
2002; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005, Boldrin et al., 2005), rising adult life expectancy (see e.g. 
Cervellati and Sunde, 2005 and 2007; Soares, 2005; Vogel, 2011), population growth or size 
(see e.g. Becker et al., 1990; Kremer, 1993; Galor and Weil, 2000; Kögel and Prskawetz, 2001; 
Galor, 2011), population density (see e.g. Boucekkine et al., 2007), and declining mortality 
(see e.g. Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2000; Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002,  2003; Boucekkine et al., 2002; 
Lagerlof, 2003; Doepke, 2005; Soares, 2005; Tamura; 2006) (Vogel, 2011). All these theories 
provide seemingly consistent explanations for the industrial revolution and the subsequent 
increase in living standards in Western countries. In particular, these theories shed light on 
different mechanisms through which the transition from a Malthusian equilibrium to a new 
dynamic one (modern growth) characterized by low fertility rates might have occurred. But, 
as Bar and Leukhina (2010:425) noted, “the relative importance of each such mechanism for 
the case of a particular country remains unclear”. This statement joins Mokyr (2005c:1147)’s 
earlier claim that “the exact connection between the demographic changes and the economic 
changes in the post-1750 period are far from being understood”. The existing theories indeed 
disagree on the main driving forces behind the economic and demographic transformations. 
As a result, it’s not clear whether demographical factors, including the emergence of the 
“European marriage pattern”22 by the late Middle Age - a phenomenon characterized by 
comparatively late marriage and low fertility rates in the North Sea Area23 - triggered the 
economic transition to modern growth and led technology (Mokyr, 1990; Clark, 2007a; Khan, 
2008). In an original paper, Bar and Leukhina (2010) even suggested that the demographic 
and economic transitions could have potentially occurred independently of one another, still 
recognizing that some causal links might explain their real “proximity”. Voigtlander and Voth 
(2006:320) also criticized the unified growth theories, stating that “what is really missing is a 
better understanding of why some countries overcame stagnation at radically different 
points in time. Attempting to address this criticism, Galor (2011) formulated the hypothesis 
that cultural, religious, geographical (natural resources, etc.), political (propensity to trade, 
etc.) or institutional (secure property rights, management of knowledge, etc.) factors may 
account for the differential timing of transition from Malthusian regime to growth across 
countries. In The Handbook of economic growth, Clark (2014) recently pointed out a set of 
empirical challenges faced by the economic theories modeling the actual world of the British 
industrial revolution in the attractive child quantity-quality framework. For instance, the fall 
in the aggregate fertility rates - although the latter were substantially lower in England than 
in France on the eve of the industrial revolution (Wrigley and Schofield, 1983) - did not occur 
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before the late 19th century in Britain. A number of studies (see e.g. Clark and Hamilton, 
2006; Boberg-Fazlic et al., 2011; Clark, 2014) have even shown evidence of a positive link 
between net fertility and economic status in pre-industrial England24. However, this pattern 
truly disappeared for marriages between 1780 and 1879. The evidence of higher returns to 
human capital, which would have acted as a powerful economic signal in favor of investment 
in human capital, is also lacking for the period traditionally associated with the industrial 
revolution (see e.g. Clark, 2003; 2005a, 2014; Clark and Cummins, 2015; compare Klemp and 
Weisdorf, 2012)25. In these conditions, why did people, especially the richer families, change 
their fertility behavior starting from the late 18th century? 
 
c) Agricultural progress 
 
According to converging estimates, agricultural productivity would have more than doubled 
in Britain between 1700 and 1850, just at the time of the industrial revolution (Deane and 
Cole, 1967; Crafts, 1985a; Allen, 1994; Overton, 1996a) (Clark, 2005b). Over the same period, 
the British population was multiplied by approximatively three. The estimates of agricultural 
productivity however vary in where exactly they place the productivity growth, reflecting a 
huge debate in the literature concerning the true timing of the British or English agricultural 
revolution. From the late 19th century, the standard view among economic historians (see 
e.g. Toynbee, 1884; Mantoux, 1906; Ernle, 1961; Mingay, 1963; Deane, 1965; Chambers and 
Mingay, 1966; Beckett, 1990; Campbell and Overton, 1993; Martins, 1993; Overton, 1996a, 
1996b) used to locate the agricultural revolution in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in a 
movement narrowly linked to the industrial revolution (Allen, 1999). Productivity growth 
was traditionally associated with different features including the parliamentary enclosure of 
land (see McCloskey, 1972), the introduction of new farming technologies like the seed drill, 
the introduction of new crops and crop rotations, and various improvements in livestock 
breeding (Thomas, 2005). These developments were supposedly promoted and facilitated by 
key innovators such as Jethro Tull, Charles Townshend, Robert Bakewell and Thomas William 
Coke. For instance, Tull is known to have brought significant improvements on the plough, 
thus contributing to economizing on expensive inputs like men and horses (Griffin, 2010). He 
is also traditionally credited with the invention of the seeder. Exploiting rationally the system 
of enclosures, Bakewell, sometimes considered as one of the fathers of modern zootechnics, 
made great advance in the field of drainage and adopted the systematic selective breeding 
of livestock. Townshend popularized the four-field rotation system which was already in 
application in Flanders, and studied its effects on various crops like wheat, turnips, barley 
and clover. In agreement with the standard view, Overton (2011) wrote: “it is difficult to 
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avoid the overwhelming mass of evidence from a wide variety of sources that points to the 
period after 1750 as witnessing an agricultural revolution”. Yet a large number of revisionist 
historians (see e.g. Havinden, 1961; Jones, 1965; Kerridge, 1967, Crafts, 1985a; Allen, 1992; 
Clark, 1998a, 1998b, 2002b) have criticized the standard view, some of them arguing that 
the major agricultural changes and much productivity growth took place earlier. In line with 
this thought, the industrial revolution is then viewed as the result of a long prior phase of 
agricultural expansion. For instance, Kerridge (1967) pointed out the quite important role 
played by up-and-down husbandry in the period 1560-1660. Using a scientific model of 
nitrogen, Allen (2008c) eventually concluded that the agricultural revolution actually took 
several centuries, the time frame needed for agricultural yields to rise from medieval to 18th 
century levels. As Tarlow (2007) noticed, “in general, over the past few decades the tendency 
has been to push back the period of revolution from the nineteenth century to find its origins 
in the fifteenth century or even earlier. It has been pointed out that few of the ‘innovations’ 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were actually new; most of the new crops and 
new techniques had been known and used somewhere in England for decades or even 
centuries. Bridging to some extent the standard and revisionist views, Allen (1999) supported 
the idea of two agricultural revolutions. The first one, mainly accomplished by the yeoman, 
would have preceded the period of parliamentary enclosures, i.e. the second half of the 18th 
century, while the second one would have occurred in the first half of the 19th century. By 
contrast, the period conventionally associated with the beginning of the British industrial 
revolution would be characterized by the stagnation of British agricultural output and 
productivity26, a result shared by other scholars (see e.g. Turner et al., 2001; Clark, 2002a). 
The existence of a phase of agricultural progress following the British take-off has likely led 
some historians (see e.g. Verley, 1997) to consider that the English agricultural revolution 
was the daughter, and not the mother, of the industrial revolution. In contradiction with 
Allen (1999, 2000, 2005b) and Clark (2002b)’s view, some scholars (see e.g. Apostolides et 
al., 2008; Banerjee, 2009; Broadberry et al., 2013) have recently shown evidence of a 
sustained rise in British agricultural output per worker throughout the 18th century, a finding 
which supports or better fits the standard stories of productivity gains. In parallel with the 
studies estimating productivity growth in the British agricultural sector during the 
preindustrial period and the industrial revolution, a number of papers (see e.g. Fogel, 2004; 
Allen, 2005b; Broadberry et al., 2011, 2015; Floud et al., 2011; Muldrew, 2011; Kelly and O 
Grada, 2013; O Grada, 2014b; Meredith and Oxley, 2014; Harris et al., 2015) have recently 
provided estimations of food supply - net agricultural value added plus net imports - 
measured in calories per head of population in England. Unsurprisingly, these estimations 
are subject to large heterogeneity as well. While Fogel (2004) and Broadberry et al. (2011, 
2015) estimate per capita supplies at around 2,200 kcals in both 1750 and 1800, Kelly and O 
Grada (2013) find significantly higher levels, more compatible with the disappearance of the 
positive check - in the sense of the short-run response of mortality to price and real wage 
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shocks - by the late 18th century in England (see e.g. Kelly and O Grada, 2014b) and the 
advantage of England over France in terms of mean adult height, real wages, life expectancy, 
and labor productivity in agriculture (Kelly and O Grada, 2014a). 
 
Reflecting in some way the debate on the true timing of the English agricultural revolution, 
the sources of agricultural progress have also been heatedly debated among agrarian 
historians. For instance, a number of scholars (see e.g. Clark, 2005b; Overton, 2011) have 
qualified the macroeconomic consequences of the agricultural practices pioneered by the 
“Great Men”, such as Jethro Tull and Charles Townshend, commonly connected to the 
English agricultural revolution. Regarding the new farming practices, Clark (1987) even went 
as far as to dismiss technological change as a key factor able to account for agricultural 
productivity growth in Britain before 1850. According to Clark (1987, 1999), agricultural 
progress, before 1850, was not revolutionary in nature, but part of a more gradual process 
of modernization which contributed, among others, to a more intensive use of the labor 
factor. In line with this view, Clark (2005b:49) noted: “when we get down to the level of what 
was happening in the fields and the barns during the Industrial revolution period we see little 
sign of any major changes”. Studying the archaeology of improvement - including rural 
improvement - in Britain over the period 1750-1850, Tarlow (2007), by contrast, mentioned 
the rise of a supposedly consensus on a nuanced version of the traditional 18th to 19th 
century English agricultural revolution. Accordingly, the 18th and 19th centuries England 
witnessed the large-scale diffusion of some innovations that had emerged much earlier in 
some parts of Britain. Measuring technology in the agriculture by the use of data related to 
patents and new book titles on agricultural methods, Ang et al. (2010, 2013) also reached 
the conclusion that technological progress played a significant role in boosting productivity 
growth in the British agriculture between 1620 and 1850 (Ang et al. 2013) and inducing the 
British industrial revolution (Ang et al., 2010). In the tradition of the papers studying the 
relation between climate and demography (see e.g. Galloway, 1985, 1986; Appleby, 1979, 
1980) or agriculture (see e.g. Overton, 1989; Michaelowa, 2001; Turner et al., 2003; Brunt, 
2004, 2015; Hoyle, 2013; Waldinger, 2014; Dalgaard et al., 2015), Martinez-Gonzalez (2015)  
found that the crucial driving forces behind the English agrarian revolution were the climate, 
which supposedly improved in the first half of the 18th century, population growth27,  and 
the capacity of adaption, especially of small farmers. With respect to the last point, Allen 
(1992, 2009b), by contrast to many historians who have first and foremost emphasized the 
role of the parliamentary enclosures and the rise of the agrarian capitalism, a phenomenon 
whose timing is unclear (Shaw-Taylor, 2012)28, thus often claimed that agricultural progress, 
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 On this point, Martinez-Gonzalez (2015) joins Boserup (1965)’s conclusions. The latter, contrary to Malthus, 
rather emphasized the role of population growth on agricultural production, and not the other way round.  
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 As Shaw-Taylor (2012:2-3) wrote: “the key point to emerge from this literature […] is that historians have 
found evidence of engrossment (the growth of larger farms through the absorption of smaller ones) in the 
fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but there is no consensus as to when the 
critical developments occurred”. 
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at least before the industrial revolution, was also greatly due to the action of the small-scale 
farmers in the open fields. 
 
Agrarian historians have actually believed in a British agricultural revolution mainly for two 
reasons (Clark, 2005b). The first reason is that by 1850 the British agriculture had reached 
levels of land and labour productivity which were significantly higher than in most European 
countries. Yet, as Clark (2005b:51) noted, “despite the popularization of the concept of the 
agricultural revolution by Toynbee and Lord Ernle as long ago as the 1880s, agrarian 
historians have been singularly unsuccessful in pinning down the details of what allowed this 
revolutionary improvement in land and labor productivity. Enclosure of common lands, the 
elimination of peasant agriculture, and  new crops such as turnips and clover, have all been 
placed center stage in the drama of the agricultural revolution. None of these actors has 
proved up to playing the lead role in a dramatic agricultural revolution”. In reality, the task of 
the agrarian historians is extremely difficult as reliable data on agricultural output and inputs 
are missing before 1866. No agricultural statistics were indeed produced at a national level 
until then. As a result, the estimates of productivity growth in agriculture cannot rely on 
direct estimates of agricultural outputs and inputs. Aware of this challenge, many scholars 
(e.g. Tarlow, 2007; Hudson, 2014) have drawn attention on the fragility of productivity 
estimates which would be critically dependent upon the chosen method of calculation, the 
set of assumptions and the sources used to infer prices, rents, levels of employment, and so 
on. Kelly and O Grada (2014a:23) even severely stated that “estimates of productivity growth 
in agriculture before the industrial revolution range so widely that very little useful can be 
inferred from them”. The second reason why agrarian historians have largely admitted the 
existence of a British agricultural revolution is because three major phenomena occurred in 
the British economy as a whole: population growth, increasing incomes and urbanization. As 
Clark (2005b:51-52) wrote: “The agricultural revolution accepted by such writers on the 
Industrial Revolution like Crafts (1985a), Harley (1993), Allen (1994), O’Brien (1996), and 
Overton (1996a, 1996b) is the one that is derived mainly from population, income, and 
urbanization”. English population indeed rose from 2.56 million of individuals in 1500 to 
17.59 million by 1850 (Clark, 2010a). Between 1550 and 1850, the real national income per 
capita in England was almost multiplied by two (Clark, 2010a). Broadberry et al. (2015) 
recently found the same multiplying factor for the evolution of British GDP per capita over 
the period 1270-1700. If the share of the population living in cities ranked well below the 
European average around 1500, England proved to be the most urbanized European nation 
other than the Netherlands by 1800. According to Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley (2014), the 
English population living in towns with 5,000 or more inhabitants rose from 3.2% to 43.5% 
between 1600 and 1850. In parallel, Allen (2009b)’s findings suggest that the fraction of the 
total workforce in agriculture dropped from 75% to 35% between 1500 and 1800. For the 
period stretching from 1710 to 1850, Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley (2014)’s estimates show a fall 
of agriculture in total employment (for males aged twenty and over) from 49.8% to 26.9%.  
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Agricultural progress has always been at the heart of the debate concerning the origins of 
the British industrial revolution. In Capital, Marx already highlighted the dramatic role of the 
enclosures that supposedly favored the capital accumulation in the British agriculture and 
contributed to form, through a movement of expropriation, the first industrial battalions and 
the proletariat. In line with the approach giving a key role to the agriculture, Rostow (1960) 
even raised agricultural progress to the level of a “precondition for take-off”. The underlying 
logic is simple. As the agricultural sector captured a great part of the economic resources in 
preindustrial societies, the industrial revolution could seemingly not take place without prior 
improvement in the agriculture. Bairoch (1974) later extended the Rostowian growth model 
by shedding light on the effects of the changing agriculture on the demand for industrial 
goods. According to Bairoch, agricultural progress contributed not only to freeing up some 
economic resources for the industry but also to stimulating industrial production. Indeed, 
the modernization of the British agriculture required investment in equipment goods, such 
as metal-made tools and machines, provided by the British industry. Moreover, agricultural 
progress arguably spurred a process of demographic growth that supposedly translated into 
effective demand for industrial consumption goods. Rostow’s focus on agriculture actually 
espoused well the ideas of Adam Smith who had understood very early the potential role of 
agricultural progress in the economy. In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations, Smith (1776) already stressed the importance of the agricultural surplus which 
could potentially be transferred to other sectors of activity through various channels like 
direct investment, the taxes and the exportations. Yet the Rostowian model, including the 
Bairoch’s extensions, has been heavily criticized in the literature. For instance, Crouzet 
(1967, 1985) contested some of Bairoch’s calculations and challenged the notion that the 
British agriculture contributed in a decisive way to industrial growth in the early stages of 
the British industrialization (see also O’Brien, 1985; Crafts, 1985a). Crouzet notably showed 
that the first modern production units in the iron/steel industry were mainly oriented to 
non-agricultural markets, such as shipbuilding and exports. Many other criticisms arose over 
the extreme linearity of the Rostowian model which indeed supposes that a take-off was 
impossible in the absence of any prior large-scale modernization of the agricultural sector. 
The precedence of an agricultural revolution over an industrial revolution is however not 
empirically well verified in the first successful economies, with the possible exception of 
Britain (Rioux, 1989). Some French historians (see e.g. Morineau, 1968, 1971 and 1974) have 
thus concluded to the absence of an agricultural revolution - or what E. Labrousse called a 
“cultural revolution” - in France before 1840. Taking the argument over, Richet (1968) even 
contended that it was rather the cities, new poles of growth, which stimulated the French 
agriculture, not the other way round. The argument of a (urban)-demand-driven agricultural 
development, which stressed the role of the cities’ growth in agricultural progress, has been 
used by several other scholars to explain why Northwestern Europe was the world’s most 
productive region in agriculture until 1800 (see e.g. de Vries, 1974; Boserup, 1981; Wrigley, 
1987, 1988; Grantham 1989, 1999; Kussmaul, 1990; Hoffman, 1996; van Zanden, 1999; 
Allen, 1998, 2000 and 2008b; Weisdorf, 2006; Campbell, 2010) (Kopsidis and Wolf, 2012). 
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Tackling this question, Mokyr (1985:21) claimed that it would be “unreasonable to think in 
terms of a necessary sequence of agriculture first, industry next”. According to Mokyr, the 
British industrial revolution largely fed itself as it provided agriculture with non-agricultural 
inputs that improved food production and distribution over the 18th and 19th centuries. For 
example, the modernization of transportation - which allowed, among others, a greater 
specialization in the British agriculture - affected the supply of agricultural products in a way 
similar to improvements in agricultural productivity properly speaking29. Furthermore, Mokyr 
(1985) argued that the British industrialization contributed to a more intensive use of labor 
in the agriculture, thus joining partly Clark (1987)’s conclusions on the causes of agricultural 
progress in Britain.  
 
The origins of the industrial resources, namely the industrial capital and labor, have been 
abundantly debated in the literature. In Britain, Marx’s thesis has been strongly qualified. In 
particular, the role of the enclosures on the capital formation (see e.g. Allen, 2008b) and 
agricultural employment (see e.g. Chambers, 1953; Gullickson, 2002; compare Snell, 1985) 
wouldn’t be statistically confirmed. The agricultural workforce actually remained roughly 
constant between 1700 and 1850, at about 1.5 million workers (Griffin, 2010:65). In line with 
this observation, a number of scholars (see e.g. Chambers and Mingay, 1966; Jones, 1974) 
concluded to the absence of massive transfers of workers from the South green England to 
the industrializing North during the 18th century. In the same vein, Crouzet (1967) rejected 
the notion that agriculture provided the British industry with a large number of workers, at 
least in the early stages of the industrial revolution, especially as the labor reallocation 
process was hampered by a low labor mobility, both geographically and sectorally, and a 
generous poor relief system (see e.g. Williamson, 1990; compare Wallis, 2014). In this 
respect, Verley (1997) noted that the rural exodus, which truly led many rural people to join 
the (industrial) cities with the hope of a better life, took place only after the take-off. This 
point is consistent with Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley (2014)’s recent statement that “urban 
growth [in England] had been dramatic in the 16th and 17th centuries but had halted in the 
18th”. In reality, the labor reallocation process described by Rostow seems quite logical as 
long as its implicit hypotheses are not questioned (Verley, 1997). First, it takes heroically for 
granted that full employment was reached in the first successful economies. Secondly, it 
makes the assumption that agricultural and industrial activities were mutually exclusive, or 
to be said differently that the rural workers could not contribute to industrial production. 
This assumption is obviously open to criticism, especially with the development of the 
theories on proto-industrialization that have moreover brought to light the existence of 
massive seasonal unemployment in agriculture before the industrial revolution (see e.g. 
Mendels, 1972; Gullickson, 1983; Ogilvie and Cerman, 1996). Thirdly, the Rostowian model 
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 The idea of agricultural improvements as positive externalities of the large-scale development of the modern 
sector is largely present in the recent growth literature. See e.g. Matsuyama (1992, 2008), Grossmann (2013) 
and Rajhi (2014). 
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assumes the existence of a unified labor market characterizing by a perfect professional and 
geographical mobility. Conclusions about the labor mobility in 18th century Britain yet seems 
to be highly dependent on the profile of the workers, the regions and the geographical scale 
(see e.g. Williamson, 1990; Anderson, 1990; Allen, 2008b; Wallis, 2014). Fourthly, it neglects 
the opportunities of specialization offered by international trade. Fifthly, it does not take 
into account the role of demographic expansion that could potentially explain how industry 
might have grown without taking lots of workers away from the agriculture. The source of 
the industrial capital has also animated lots of discussions among scholars. These discussions 
have actually been part of a larger debate about the role of capital formation in the British 
industrial revolution. Most of the debate developed around the idea formulated by Lewis 
and Rostow in the 1950s that a take-off could not occur without a sudden upward leap of 
the national gross investment rate. According to Rostow (1960) and Bairoch (1974), capital 
accumulation necessarily took place in the agriculture. In line with this view, agricultural 
progress and the reorganization of the agricultural sector, which led to the concentration of 
land revenues, were crucial to finance the industrial revolution. Without neglecting the role 
that agriculture might truly have played in funding the British industrialization, a number of 
scholars have put emphasis on other potential sources of capital accumulation, for instance 
colonial and international trade (see e.g. Marx, 1867; Williams 1944; Frank 1978; Wallerstein 
1974, 1980; Pomeranz, 2000). International trade indeed increasingly expanded as from the 
Great discoveries and contributed to enrich the Western European nations involved in trade, 
especially those having well-endowed colonies. At that time, mercantilism reigned supreme 
in Western Europe and favored the inflows of precious metals, thus contributing to the 
development of monetary economies (Hamilton, 1934). Due to the lack of reliable data, it is 
however very difficult to come up with any formal conclusion about the ulterior use of the 
capital accumulated in agriculture and international trade, especially as this capital could 
have financed indirectly some industrial activities, notably through the banking and the fiscal 
channel. Nevertheless, there seems to be evidence that part of this capital turned away from 
industrial investment and was rather invested in public bonds, commercial activities, lands 
and properties, or simply hoarded. Concerning the capital from trade, a number of scholars 
have contended that the profits from trade were far too modest - or too modestly invested 
in the British industry - to have had any direct role in the causation of the British industrial 
revolution (see e.g. Engerman, 1972; O’Brien, 1982; Acemoglu et al., 2005b). In the same 
vein, Mokyr (1985) argues that the contribution of the profits from trade to the European 
capital accumulation was insufficient to justify any Europe’s advantage. With respect to the 
agriculture, Allen (2008b) defended that this sector did not release large quantities of capital 
by reducing its demand for investment, and that agricultural surplus did not prove to finance 
massively the industrial capital formation in Britain, thus endorsing Postan (1935:2)’s view 
that little of the wealth of rural England “found its way into the new industrial enterprises”. 
In agreement, Crafts (1985a) also calculated that agricultural savings funded only little non-
agricultural investment. Assessing the different channels through which the industrial sector 
might have financed its development, Crouzet (1965:172) finally concluded that “the capital 
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which made possible the creation of large-scale factory industries in Britain came…mainly 
from industry itself”. According to this economic historian, most of modern industrial firms 
were able to self-finance their expansion. This result corroborates the widespread belief that 
the primitive capital, as well as the financial markets, played only a small role in launching 
the British industrial revolution. The financial innovations, introduced all along the 18th and 
19th centuries, would thus have been more crucial in a second stage when technical progress 
made necessary the purchase of very costly equipment goods and the adjustment of the 
industrial facilities (Cottrell, 1980). Summarizing in some way this view, Mokyr (1999:63) 
stated that “there is little evidence that the financial markets were instrumental in helping 
modern industry more than vice versa”. Some scholars have yet pointed out the importance 
of international markets and foreign capital, especially the capital coming from Holland (see 
e.g. Wilson, 1966), for funding the British industrialization (see e.g. Chenery and Syrquin, 
1975; Crafts, 1983; Neal, 1993; Brezis, 1995). 
 
Did agricultural progress really contribute to the British industrial revolution? According to 
Allen (1999, 2008b), the answer is very dependent on the true timing of the British agrarian 
revolution.. Did the British agricultural revolution precede the industrial revolution, or was it 
rather coincident with it? As Clark (2005b:50) said, a diffuse revolution occurring precisely at 
the time of the Industrial Revolution implies that the gains of the Industrial Revolution period 
most likely stemmed from some economy wide social or institutional change - changed 
attitudes on the part of all producers as in Jan de Vries’ Industrious Revolution, or improved 
incentives for all economic actors as in North and Weingast’s analysis of the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, or superior incentives to move labor out of agriculture as argued by 
O’Brien (1996). Believing in a British agrarian revolution prior to the British industrialization, 
Allen (2008b:116) thus stated that “one reason why the industrial revolution could proceed in 
the face of a largely static agriculture was that agriculture had already revolutionised itself 
between 1600 and 1750”. In the same vein, Crafts (1985c) contended that agriculture did 
release labor between 1500 and 1750 when the agricultural share of the population fell. In 
agreement with this view, de Pleijt and van Zanden (2013) attributed great part of the British 
success to the structural or occupational change that occurred over the period 1300-1800, a 
phenomenon statistically confirmed by recent Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley (2014)’s estimates.  
Borowiecki and Tepper (2015) also defended that structural change away from agriculture 
was likely one of the main drivers of the British breakout from Malthusian dynamics, as it 
increased the sustainable population growth, i.e. the rate at which the British population 
could expand without triggering declining living standards. Finally, Deane (1979:48) wrote 
that “if the agricultural industry did not actually supply the labor which the labor intensive 
techniques of the new industry demanded, it fed the increasing population from which the 
industrial labor force was drawn”, thus joining Crafts and Harley (2004)’s view. Looking for 
the exact role of agriculture, Zangheri (2005) rather noticed that agricultural progress could 
hardly be considered as a sufficient condition for the industrial revolution to have occurred. 
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By way of illustration, Zangheri (2005) showed that the agricultural advances observed in the 
most flexible societies/economies of medieval Europe did not produce anything that would 
look like an industrial revolution. Mokyr (1985:21) went so far as to question the necessary 
character of agricultural progress, advocating that “it is unwarranted to infer that because 
agricultural growth affected industrialization, the latter could not have taken place without 
the former”. Giving seemingly support to this view, more recent studies have shown that the 
role of agricultural progress on industrialization needs to be seriously reconsidered when 
switching from the context of a closed economy to the context of an open one. In a pioneer 
work, Matsuyama (1992) thus developed an endogenous growth model which predicts a 
positive link between agricultural progress and economic growth (industrialization) for the 
closed economy case - a result shared by many other scholars (see e.g. Sato and Niho, 1971; 
Murphy et al.,1989; Laitner, 2000; Caselli and Coleman, 2001; Kögel and Prskawetz, 2001; 
Eswaran and Kotwal, 2002; Gollin and al., 2002; Voigtländer and Voth, 2006; Francisco and 
Markus, 2011; Gollin and Rogerson, 2014; compare Bustos and al., 2015) - but a negative link 
for the open economy case. In line with this result, Clark (2002b) reached the conclusion that 
the growing English population, at least during the period of the industrial revolution, was 
fed mainly through food imports and switching agricultural output towards food products, 
not through an agricultural revolution. In a review of John Hicks (1942)’ book entitled The 
social framework, J.R. Hicks (1999) already wrote: “If England had been obliged to support 
her population entirely from her own soil, there can be little doubt that England would have 
experienced a [demographic] disaster before the nineteenth century was over. In fact, in the 
years before improvements in ocean transport made it easy to import foodstuffs on a great 
scale, food in England was very scarce; the Corn Law agitation was the sign of a real scarcity, 
the premonitory symptom of what might have grown into a much greater calamity. As it 
was, the cheapening of transport made it possible for the English people to draw upon the 
ample supplies of agricultural land in the New Worlds of America and Australia, and so to 
remedy their own shortage. But how was it possible for the English people to save 
themselves in this way, and not possible for the Irish to do so as well? The reason is that 
imports have to be paid for. If the agricultural land available in England was becoming small 
relatively to the population, England possessed other natural resources, in the form of coal 
and other minerals, and she was continually adding to her man-made equipment, her 
factories and mines, her ships and her railways. All these resources enabled her to produce a 
plenty of goods which she could exchange against foodstuffs from overseas. Although he put 
emphasis on agricultural progress before 1750 as a key factor of the British industrialization, 
Allen (2008b:115) still recognized that “if one asks how British agriculture fed the expanding 






d) Demand-side factors 
 
Some part of the literature devoted to identifying the causes of the industrial revolution has 
suggested that the technological inventions of the late 18th century Britain were driven by 
demand, both domestic and foreign. In a pioneer work, Gilboy (1932) already highlighted the 
parallel role that demand should have played at the time of the industrial revolution. In a 
more recent paper, O’Brien and Engerman (1991) showed that even small variations in 
demand could potentially move a country from one economic track to another, thus giving 
credit to the demand-side factors (Mokyr, 1999). The demand-driven approach implicitly 
assumes that the aggregate supply curve shifted because of a rise in the aggregate demand. 
Technological change would so have constituted the original entrepreneurs’ response to the 
rising demand for British manufactured products. Proponent of the demand-driven account 
of the British industrialization, McKendrick (1982) first introduced the concept of consumer 
revolution to describe the “large and rapid increase in the consumption of consumer goods 
such as tableware, curtains, pictures, and cutlery, a lust for objects” (Clark, 2010c:1) that 
supposedly occurred in the period 1600-1750. As McKendrick (1982:9) wrote: “A consumer 
revolution occurred in England in the 18th century along with the Industrial Revolution….The 
consumer revolution was a turning point in the history of human experience”. The concept of 
consumer revolution has been empirically funded, at least partly, on probate inventories, the 
major source of information on material life in England between 1600 and 1750, which seem 
to show a rise in English households’ material possession over the 17th and 18th centuries 
(see e.g. Weatherill, 1988, 1993; Shammas, 1990; Styles, 1993; Overton et al., 2004)30. The 
idea of a consumer revolution has yet been challenged in the literature, especially by 
scholars who fail to observe any parallel rise in real day wages in Britain. As an attempt to 
provide a solution to this apparent incompatibility and rescue the concept of consumer 
revolution, de Vries (1994, 2008) then came up with a new theory of industrious revolution 
to describe the set of changes in household behavior that supposedly took place in the 17th 
and 18th centuries in Britain and Northwestern Europe. According to this theory, British 
households, both male and female individuals, started to work harder in order to increase 
their level of consumption, thus becoming more industrious, i.e. more market-oriented 
(Koyama, 2009). In economic terms, the British households became more willing to trade 
leisure for money as the relative utility of income was increasing along with the rise of a 
market society, which in turn translated into larger demand for industrial goods31. In parallel 
to the consumer revolution, and the attendant industrious revolution, a number of studies 
have brought to light the early existence in Britain of a large (urban) consumer class whose 
living standards were comparatively high on the eve of the industrial revolution, due in part 
to agricultural and commercial progress (see e.g. Bairoch, 1974; Wrigley, 1985; Allen, 2001, 
2003, 2008a, 2009b, 2010; Maddison, 2008; de Vries, 2008; Persson, 2008; Broadberry et al., 
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2011, 2015). Interestingly, Allen and Weisdorf (2011) considered that a consumer revolution 
was more likely to happen in rural areas, thus joining styles (2002)’s conclusions. The high 
degrees of British urbanization and living standards or income32, which were reflected to 
some extent in the development of a consumer society in the 17th and 18th centuries Britain 
(see e.g. McKendrick, 1974; McKendrick et al., 1982; Weatherill, 1988, 2006; H.C. Mui and 
L.H. Mui, 1988; Hoh-Chueng and Lorna, 1989; de Vries, 1993; Fairchilds, 1993; Lemire, 1984, 
1992, 1997; Berg and Clifford, 1999, Berry, 2002; Stobart and Hann, 2004; Berg, 2004, 2005; 
Reis, 2005; Vickery, 2006; Styles, 2006, 2007; McCants, 2007; Hersh and Voth, 2009), have 
often been advanced in the literature to account for the British economic success after 1750 
(see e.g. Habakkuk, 1962; Wrigley, 1967; de Vries, 1984, 1994, 2008; Voigtlander and Voth, 
2006; Allen, 2009b, 2010; Brunt and Garcia-Penalosa, 2012; Abramson and Boix, 2014). The 
advantages of cities - where the wages were traditionally higher (see e.g. Habakkuk, 1962; 
Allen, 2009b, 2010) - for promoting growth, and more specifically technological change, have 
been greatly discussed in the literature. On the demand side, it has mainly been advocated 
that cities provided large consumption markets that favored new entrepreneurial ventures 
and innovative activities, as well as the development of a large-scale industry characterized 
by a much finer division of labor. In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, Adam Smith (1776) early emphasized the importance of the consumption markets 
size in determining the production volume and the production scale of the firms. And Smith 
strongly believed that the specialization - and so the division of labor - was one of the most 
important channels through which technological change occurred, thus joining many other 
scholars’ view that the market size is a crucial determinant of innovation (see e.g. Sokoloff, 
1988; North, 1990, Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, Khan and Sokoloff, 2001, Sokoloff and 
khan, 1990, 2000; Desmet and Parente, 2010, 2012, 2014). In addition to providing large 
markets for better and cheaper goods, the cities would also have contributed to developing 
different institutions such as the public services and the intellectual property rights (see e.g. 
Sokoloff, 1988; Sokoloff and Khan, 1990, 2000 and 2001; Khan, 2002) (Nair-Reichert and 
Weinhold, 2009), as well as the transportation technology as the cities were dependent on 
supplies from the countryside. The modernization of the transport infrastructure, in turn, 
played a key role in the British industrialization (see e.g. Szostak, 1991). Rostow (1960) even 
identified the modernization of the transport infrastructure as a precondition for take-off. It 
has often been argued that the improvements in transportation, combined with the absence 
of important internal trade barriers, contributed to creating very early a more integrated and 
unified consumption market in Britain, by comparison with most European countries, thus 
favoring the expansion of a large-scale industry (see e.g. Chartres, 2003; McCloskey, 2010a). 
The idea of demand-driven technological change can also be found in the leapfrogging or 
bottleneck models - presented by David Landes (1969) - in which a sudden increase in the 
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productivity of one sector or activity, such as weaving, generates a demand for technological 
progress in another complementary sector or activity, such as spinning (Mokyr, 1999). 
 
Although increasingly popular, the demand-side factors, including population growth, are 
however more difficult to integrate into the industrial story. Indeed, supply and demand are 
not symmetrical in long-term economic change (Mokyr, 1977). As Mokyr (1999:39) wrote, “if 
the industrial output increased and technology possibly changed because of a rise in demand 
for industrial goods, it has to be made clear why demand increased in the first place. Changes 
in demand are not exogenous to an economic system”. A large number of scholars have thus 
criticized the demand-driven approach, emphasizing that most inventions of the industrial 
revolution arose in already existing markets like the textiles, the metallurgy, and the paper 
industry (see e.g. Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979). Production growth on those markets may 
consequently be interpreted as technical progress shifting the supply curve to the right along 
the demand curve. The consumer revolution, defined as the key causal factor for the British 
industrial revolution, has also met many objections in the literature. For instance, due to the 
chronological gap between the peak of the British consumer revolution (1680-1720) and the 
industrial revolution, Weatherill (1988) concluded that the two phenomena were largely 
independent from each other. If changes in the household consumption behavior possibly 
triggered the British industrial revolution, other scholars wondered why the Dutch Republic, 
which has often been considered as the first modern economy regarding its preindustrial 
level of urbanization and income per capita or living standards (see e.g. de Vries, 1974, 1984, 
2008; van der Woude, 1980; de Vries and van der Woude, 1997; Mijnhardt, 2010; de Jong, 
2011; van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2012), did not become the cradle of the industrial 
revolution. As v.d. Heuvel and Ogilvie (2013:70) wrote: “the Dutch Republic - where the 
income per capita was 50% higher than in Britain by 1700 (Maddison, 2003) (Mokyr, 2010a) - 
is universally regarded as the first economy to experience an explosive transformation in 
retailing that enabled broad masses of consumers to shift from household to market 
consumption and production”. With respect to the supposed British industrious revolution, 
Allen and Weisdorf (2011) found evidence of an industrious revolution among British rural 
farmers in the second half of the 18th century, thus joining Voth (2000, 2001)’s results, but 
showed that the phenomenon was the consequence of economic hardship, and so did not 
feature any sign of a consumer revolution. On this last point, v.d. Heuvel and v.n Meerkerk 
(2014) drew attention on the fact that the alterations in work practices might not have only 
resulted from a changing consumer behavior in the restricted form of what de Vries (1994, 
2008) called an industrious revolution, a phenomenon that incidentally required quite well-
established market institutions (see e.g. Ogilvie, 2010, van den Heuvel and Ogilvie, 2013). In 
a recent paper, Clark (2010c) went as far as to refute the existence of any British consumer 
revolution over the period 1600-1750. Indeed, Clark rather assimilated the phenomenon to a 
statistical artifact resulting from a misinterpretation of the probate inventories. Concerning 
the potential role of the cities in the British industrial revolution, Mokyr (1995) argued that 
31 
 
the supply-side factors associated to urbanization - which supposedly consisted in providing 
environments highly conducive to the positive externalities and economies of agglomeration 
and scale highlighted by the economics of growth, as well as to the diffusion, through human 
interactions, and the preservation of information and knowledge (see e.g. Boserup, 1981; 
Jacobs, 1969, 1984; Bairoch, 1988, 1991; Glaeser et al., 1992; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; 
Hall, 2000; Duranton and Puga, 2001, 2002 and 2004; Glaeser, 1994, 2010; Brunt and Garcia-
Penalosa, 2012; Hartwick, 2015) - likely played a more important role than the demand-side 
factors33. Mokyr (1995:25) also emphasized one effect of the lack of centralization of the 
political power in Britain, i.e. the “relative unimportance of London as an administrative and 
cultural center when compared to other European capitals such as Madrid, Paris, Saint 
Petersburg, or Vienna”, as one possible advantage for Britain in the race for industrialization. 
Thinking more generally about the “demand-driven” hypothesis of the British industrial 
revolution, Mokyr (1999:41) eventually concluded that supply was the more interesting and 
important historically: “an autonomous and prior shift of the industry demand curve was not 
an essential part of the story”. It does not mean that demand had no influence at all on the 
British inventions of the late 18th century. For instance, demand can potentially have a great 
impact on technological activity when it turns from an industry, or a segment of an industry, 
which does not exhibit a high innovative potential, or is more simply resistant to innovation, 
to another industry (Mokyr, 1999). The examples of cotton and coal might perfectly illustrate 
this point for Britain. In the 17th century, cotton was mainly imported from India (in the form 
of calicos) through the commercial activities of the East India Trading Company. Cotton was 
then traditionally used to manufacture various items such as drapes and clothing. More 
comfortable than wool and cheaper than silk, the cotton fabric became increasingly popular 
and fashionable in the eyes of British households (Fisher, 2012). In spite of the introduction 
of the Calico Act, passed in 1721 and then repealed in 1774, the British cotton industry thus 
surprisingly continued to develop as the prohibition was in practice widely evaded. This, in 
turn, contributed to expanding the British ports of the west coast. By way of illustration, the 
county of Lancashire, which houses the port of Liverpool, remarkably grew into one of the 
most important epicenters of the British cotton industry, due in part to favorable climate 
conditions (good level of damp) for the yarn spinning operations. It has often been argued 
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revolution, such as Watt, Smeaton, Roebuck, Wedgwood, Rennie, Henry, Keir, and many others, were able to 
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that the demand shift towards cotton-made goods, whose manufacture was much easier to 
mechanize, helped to increase not only the production but also the rate of technological 
progress in the textile industry (see e.g. Mann and Wadsworth, 1931). In the same vein, 
some scholars have highlighted the role of demand for the rapid growth of the coal industry. 
Based on new constructed series on coal rents, the price of coal at pithead and at market, 
and the price of firewood, Clark and Jacks (2007) thus concluded that the rise in demand for 
coal during the industrial revolution did more for the expansion of the coal industry than the 
technological innovations in mining.  
 
e) Trade and empire 
 
On the eve of its industrial revolution, Britain was a country characterized by a relatively high 
degree of openness. People, both emigrants and tourists, and capital moved in and out of 
the country with ease. British Intellectuals were free to correspond and exchange their ideas 
with colleagues over the Channel and across the Atlantic (Mokyr, 1999). The share of foreign 
trade in British NNI - net national income - amounted to around 9% in the mid-18th century, 
making Britain one of the world’s greatest trading nation, then rose to around 16% by 1800 
(Clark, 2010a). Enjoying privileged access to sea and the most powerful navy in the world, 
Britain, which was guided by a pronounced colonial spirit, increased the level of its exports 
and imports all over the 17th and 18th centuries (see e.g. Cain and Hopkins, 1993; Morgan, 
2000; Harley, 2004; Daudin et al., 2010). This expansion of trade was accompanied by the 
growth of the British ports, such as Liverpool, London, Bristol or Glasgow, and contributed to 
the economic development of the harbors’ hinterlands, especially those active in textiles. 
British exports essentially consisted of industrial products like cotton goods, woolen goods, 
ironwares and manufactures. In 1700, the woolen products represented around 69% of all 
British exports34. This share progressively declined in the 18th century to reach more or less 
20% in 1800. British exports of cotton products really took off in the second half of the 18th 
century. Between 1770 and 1830, a period which witnessed the introduction of great textile 
inventions, the share of cotton goods in British exports increased from around 2% to 44%. In 
the same time, British imports of raw cotton exploded. The commercial circuit is well known. 
The colonial workforce, especially the one from North-America, provided Britain with the 
necessary raw cotton. Cotton-made goods were then produced in British industrial centers 
and either consumed domestically or exported to the rest of the world35. If the non-textile 
industry accounted for a relatively small proportion of British exports in 1700, it increased its 
participation to foreign trade in the 18th century, thus reinforcing the growing dependence 
of the British industry on international markets. In the 18th century, British imports consisted 
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 Data on the sectoral patterns of British foreign trade is from Clark (2010a).  
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 See e.g. Davis (1979) and Crouzet (1980) for a discussion on the role of the cotton textile trade in the British 
industrial revolution.  
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overwhelmingly of raw materials like raw cotton, wool, linen, silk and timber, and foodstuffs 
like grains, sugar, tea and wine. A substantial part of the tropical products imported from the 
colonies was reexported with huge profit, mainly to Europe. Not only the sectoral patterns 
but also the geographical patterns of British foreign trade changed over time. While Europe 
absorbed around 85% of British exports in 1700, the proportion fell to 30% in 1800 and 48% 
in 183036. At the same time, the American share rose from 10% in 1700 to 57% in 1800 and 
38% in 1830. This evolution translated a great reinforcement of the trading partnership with 
the USA that seemingly offered a promising market to the British industrialists. The share of 
the rest of the world in British exports - including Asia whose importance remarkably rose 
between 1770 and 1830 (Solar, 2013) - increased from around 4% in 1700 to around 12% in 
1800 and 14% in 1830. Even though British exports expanded rapidly during the industrial 
revolution period, it should be noted that Britain did not adhere to a regime of free trade 
before the 1840s (Fremdling, 2004). International trade indeed remained strongly controlled 
in Europe until the mid-19th century when protectionism started to be viewed as a limit to 
economic development, and particularly in Britain which henceforth sought to consolidate 
its economic supremacy. The liberal watershed was really initiated in Europe when Britain 
abolished the Corn Laws37 in 1846, in part due to the pressure of the British industry, and the 
Shipping Acts in 1849. An economic free trade agreement was concluded between Britain 
and France in 1860. If the free trade dynamics rapidly spread out to other countries like the 
Zollverein, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Russia, the German Customs Act of 
1879 constituted the starting point of a new protectionist period that intensified after the 
1929 crisis and lasted until the end of the Second World War.    
 
International trade, one of the most visible forms of economic activity, has always received 
attention from scholars in the quest of the causes of the industrial revolution in Northwest 
Europe, especially in Britain and France, two coastal countries that possessed colonies and 
proved to be early involved in trade. The proponents of the trade account have usually made 
recourse to two basic arguments. The first one is that foreign and colonial trade gave access 
to goods which were not available at home or could not be domestically produced with the 
same level of efficiency. This argument refers to the real gains of international trade. The 
second argument is that international trade opened up new markets which were necessary 
for industrial expansion and progress. Since the publication of Toynbee (1884)’s lectures on 
the industrial revolution in England, successive generations of economic historians have thus 
pointed out the role of British foreign trade as a powerful engine of industrial progress, thus 
joining many growth theorists’ view (see e.g. Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Ades 
and Glaeser, 1999; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Alesina et.al., 2000; Dollar and Kraay, 2003, 
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 The Corn Laws constituted a set of regulatory texts adopted in Britain between 1773 and 1815. They set the 
framework for cereal exchanges with the other countries. For instance, the Corn Law Act of 1815 forbade the 
importation of cereals when prices dropped below a certain threshold. 
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2004; Alcala and Ciccone, 2004) (Ahmed, 2012). As Sachs and Warner (1995:3) wrote: “Trade 
promotes growth through a myriad of channels: increased specialization, efficient resource 
allocation according to comparative advantage, diffusion of international  knowledge 
through trade, and heightened domestic competition as a result of international 
competition”. Deane and Cole (1967:83) thus claimed that “there is no doubt of the central 
importance of overseas trade in the expansion of the British economy”. In the same vein, 
O’Brien and Engerman (1991) sustained that the British exports were not solely important 
but also necessary to British industrial growth in the 18th century. Allen (2003:432) stated 
that “intercontinental trade boom was a key development that propelled Northwestern 
Europe forward”, especially as trade openness accelerated the structural transformation in 
the northwestern European countries, i.e. the process of labor reallocation from agriculture 
to industry, which supposedly accounted for most growth38. Connecting the relationship 
between trade and economic growth to the British industrialization, Habakkuk and Deane 
(1963) contended that demand coming from trade propelled the new Industrial Revolution 
industries. In line with this view, Cuenca (1997:900) advocated that “the overseas demand in 
general provided the opportunity and the stimulus for technological innovation as the 
industry reached the limits of growth within a protected domestic market”. Looking for the 
origins of the “Great Divergence”, Pomeranz (2000) argued that one of the key differences 
able to explain why Britain, and not China, experienced an industrial revolution in the late 
18th century is that Britain enjoyed privileged access to the raw materials of the New World. 
The historian of the “slave trade” Inikori (2002) also attributed British economic success to 
overseas trade, considering that Britain was the first case of an export-led industrialization in 
human history. In the wake of Acemoglu et al. (2005b)’s work, which accounts for British rise 
to economic superiority by a close interplay between the Atlantic trade and the institutional 
constraints on the executive power in Britain, Cordoba (2007) located the roots of the British 
industrial revolution into the colonization era which supposedly provided Britain with an 
expanding set of trading and exploitation opportunities in Europe and Asia, as well as in the 
New World39. Assessing the role of trade, Clark, O’Rourke and Taylor (2008) stated that “the 
magnitude, scale and transforming power of the Industrial Revolution lay in its unification of 
technological advance with the military power that generated easy British access to the 
markets of Europe, the Americas, the Near East and the Far East”, thus giving support to 
Findlay and O’Rourke (2007)’s view that early trade in Britain was the consequence of some 
comparative advantage coupled to the “musket and the cannon”40. Allen (2009b, 2010) was 
recently convinced to have found the Holy Grail, the solution to the puzzle of the timing and 
location of the industrial revolution, by developing a new theory placing trade at the center 
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 In contradiction with this view, although not irreconcilable, Epstein (2000) pointed out the importance of a 
strong centralized state, rather than the constraints on the executive, to guarantee the existence of a unified 
national market and overcome the economic barriers of political fragmentation (Broadberry, 2014).  
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 In the same vein, Hoffman (2012) argued that the economic consequences of Britain and Europe’s military 
power, symbolized by a great domination in the gunpowder technology, were huge, from colonialism to the 
slave trade and even the industrial revolution. 
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of his accounts. According to this author, British success in trade contributed to increasing 
urbanization, and so creating a unique wage and price structure in Britain, characterized by 
comparatively high wages (international standards) and cheap energy, which supposedly 
induced the labor-saving technological inventions of the industrial revolution. Foreign trade 
moreover would have modified positively the internal rate of return for industrial investment, 
thus encouraging the “technological bet” in the British industry.  
 
Yet the idea of a trade-driven industrialization is far from being consensual in the literature. 
While it is widely acknowledged that technological change boosted British exports as from 
the second half of the 18th century - reflecting to some extent the notion that economic 
growth is ultimately a supply-side phenomenon (Mokyr, 1977; McCloskey, 1981; Daudin et 
al., 2010) -, the exact role of foreign trade and overseas demand in triggering or inducing 
technological change and industrial progress is still heatedly debated. As Krugman (1995) 
noted, the question is more controversial in that direction. Thus, Flinn (1966) emphasized 
the domestic market - which seemingly was large enough to cover the expenses of every 
individual entrepreneur (Mokyr, 1999) - as the mainspring of technological change and 
industrial growth in Britain. In line with this view, Davis (1979:62) claimed that “overseas 
trade did not have an important direct role in bringing about the Industrial Revolution”. In 
the same vein, Thomas and McCloskey (1981:102) concluded their study by stating that “in 
the late 18th century, the strongest effect between commerce abroad and industry at home 
was from industrialization to commerce, not the reverse. Trade was the child of industry”. 
The same conclusion was reached by trade theorists such as Kindleberger (1964) and Findlay 
(1982) (Mokyr, 1999). Convinced by the “home grown” nature of the industrial revolution on 
the supply side, Mokyr (1985:23) noted that “the gains accruing to the British economy from 
foreign trade were not necessary to achieve the gains from productivity growth. Given that 
technical progress occurred, however, its beneficial effects were enhanced by the expansion 
of trade” - mainly through learning by doing and experience. Very recently, Borowiecki and 
Tepper (2015) also found that trade played only a minor role in the British breakout at the 
time of the Industrial revolution. According to all these theories placing the home market at 
the center of the industrial story, the growing dependence of the British economy on foreign 
markets during the industrial revolution period, a phenomenon well documented in a recent 
study of Clark, O’Rourke and Taylor (2014), was an ex-post economic reality, not something 
that initially drove industrial growth and technological change.  
 
Another facet of what Palma (2015) called the “revisionist literature” has rejected the idea 
that international trade was the decisive trigger of the British industrial revolution because 
of the relatively small share of the external sector in early modern Britain’s economy. But as 
Mokyr (1999:44) wrote, “any inference regarding the ‘importance’ of exports based on what 
proportion of output was exported is highly suspect”. A high rate of trade openness does not 
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necessarily mean that the gains from trade are important for a specific country, especially if 
the country’s technology and endowments, in terms of both natural resources and factors, 
are identical to those of its trading partners. In the extreme case of full employment, it may 
even be harmful if trade diverts massively national resources from domestic consumption 
(McCloskey, 2010a). In the opposite case, a low rate of trade openness does not necessarily 
mean that foreign trade is not crucial for a specific country, especially if the country imports 
resources that are not available at home or only at huge cost. In Britain, the goods that were 
imported like the tropical products (tea, sugar, tobacco, etc.), the European foodstuffs (wine, 
corn, et.), and the raw materials, especially raw cotton, all proved to play an important role 
in the British economy, and some of them were critical inputs in the British industry (Mokyr, 
1985; Findlay, 1990). In a recent paper, Clark, O’Rourke and Taylor (2008:2) concluded that 
the history of the British industrialization would have been very different in case substantial 
trade barriers would have prevented Britain from having access to the external markets it 
did exploit: “British incomes per person, instead of rising by 45% between the 1760s and 
1850s would have risen by a mere 5%. The TFP growth rate, already a modest 0.4% per year, 
would have fallen to 0.22% per year”. This conclusion highly contrasts with Harley (1994)’s 
previous findings41  but is more in adequation with many scholars’ view that the gains from 
trade were actually important in Britain and that British real income would have been much 
lower in the context of a closed economy (see e.g. Wrigley, 1987; O’Brien, 1999; Ormrod, 
2003; Acemoglu et al., 2005b; Allen, 2003, 2009b and 2010; Palma, 2015). The aggregate 
statistics on the British external sector would hide the real effects of international trade on 
British economy, especially as British exports were overwhelmingly composed of industrial 
goods and highly specialized in a few industries, the ones that Rostow famously called the 
leading sectors of the British industrial revolution. By providing stimuli to these industries, 
foreign trade might have favored the emergence of new technologies that, in turn, might 
have generated positive spillovers to the rest of the economy. This refers to the potential 
dynamic effect of international trade on industrialization and economic growth. The dynamic 
argument has also been brandished by scholars who believe that foreign trade promoted the 
development of growth-friendly institutions in Britain (see e.g. Braudel, 1980; Acemoglu et 
al., 2005b; Cordoba, 2007). As Harley (1994:307-308) noted: “Trade might not have greatly 
increased per capita income but it created the cities and classes that challenged the 
aristocratic establishment that ruled from time immemorial”. Highly critical of these studies 
aiming at computing the static Smithian gains from international trade, Findlay and O’Rourke 
(2007) contended that “comparative static models cannot, by definition, say anything about 
the impact of trade on growth (p.337) […] International trade was a key reason why the 
British Industrial Revolution was sustained (p.339) […] The success of the European Industrial 
Revolution is intimately connected with trade and overseas expansion (p.364)”. According to 
Palma (2015:2), the dynamic argument of foreign trade has pushed a number of scholars 
                                                          
41
 Harley however failed to take into account the impact of trade on preferences for foreign goods and work 
patterns (see e.g. Malthus, 1836; de Vries, 1994, 2008; Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Hersh and Voth, 2009; v.d. 
Heuvel and N.Meerkerk, 2014). 
37 
 
who were initially “revisionist”, like O’Brien and Mokyr, to adopt a more nuanced position 
concerning the role of trade openness in British industrialization. “The reason for this shift in 
thinking is that there may be indirect, dynamic general equilibrium and spillover effect gains 
from trading”. Thus, although still in disagreement with the notion that trade can take credit 
for the British industrial revolution42, Mokyr (2010a) however recognized that “the openness 
of the economy was an important part of the story”. On the contrary, in Bourgeois Dignity 
and liberty, McCloskey (2010a) still recently considered that the logic of trade-as-an-engine 
was dubious and that even the dynamic effects of trade were small43. Rejecting foreign trade 
as the cause of the British industrial revolution, McCloskey (2010a) finally concluded: “Trade 
is anyway too old and too widespread to explain a uniquely European – even British – event”.  
 
f) Institutional and political factors 
 
The role of the institutional and political environment has also been the object of growing 
interest in the literature. Thus, according to some scholars, the reason why the industrial 
revolution started in Britain is because the country had the “right institutions”, notably the 
right political institutions. The idea that institutions matter for economic development has 
reflected a rising consensus in the economic literature (see e.g. North, 1989, 1990; Nelson 
and Sampat, 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; Dixit, 2004, 2009; Dam, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2005a; 
Greif, 2006a, 2006b; Helpman, 2008; Nelson, 2008; North et al., 2009; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012; Ogilvie and Carus, 2014; Galiani and Sened, 2014;  Fosu, 2015; compare 
Glaeser et al., 2004). In line with this institutionalist literature, a large number of historians 
have located the roots of the British industrial revolution into the “Glorious Revolution”, also 
called the “bloodless revolution”, which broke out in England in 1688 and finally led to the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights (1689) just ten years after the Habeas Corpus Act (1679) (see 
e.g. North and Weingast 1989; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). As Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012:4) wrote, “the reason that Britain is richer than Egypt is because in 1688, Britain (or 
England to be exact) had a revolution that transformed the politics and thus the economics of 
the nation”. The Glorious Revolution indeed marked the starting point of a quite long period 
of relative peace and political stability on the British territory44. This political event moreover 
supposedly contributed to create a business environment conducive to entrepreneurship, 
especially by consolidating the parliamentary monarchy, limiting the power of the King and 
                                                          
42
 For instance, Mokyr (2010) - as well as several other scholars (see e.g. Meisenzahl et al., 2012; Humphries, 
2013a; Kelly et al., 2014) - rejected Allen (2009b,2010)’s theory of an induced industrial revolution, i.e. an 
industrial revolution induced by Britain’s factor prices (high wages and low energy costs), which supposedly 
were the consequence of Britain’s participation in trade. See Crafts (2011) for a parallel discussion of the two 
theories developed by Allen (2009b, 2010) and Mokyr (2010). 
43
 See the Chapters 18 and 19 of McCloskey (2010a)’s book. 
44
 In a recent book, Rosenthal and Wong (2011) also used this line of argument, among others, to explain why 
the industrial revolution first took place in England, and not in Continental Europe.   
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the action of the government, as well as reinforcing the property rights and contracting 
institutions. The new regime, headed by the Protestants William III of Orange and Mary II of 
England, also adopted new financial institutions, some had been previously developed on 
the Continent, and allowed the creation of the first national bank, namely the Governor and 
Company of the bank of England, which provided the public sector with lots of money, a 
large part of which was used to finance the development of the Royal Navy that became the 
“Master of the oceans”, thus helping British expansion in foreign trade (O’Brien, 1998, 2005 
and 2011). North and Weingast (1989) directly attributed the rise of the modern public 
credit in 18th century England - and the financial revolution - to the establishment of a new 
Constitutional monarchy which defended creditors’ property rights against the exercise of 
arbitrary state power. According to O’Brien (1991), the British authorities increasingly grew 
in favor of property and against customary rights all over the 18th century. This evolution, 
which highly contrasted with the situation in most of Europe, especially during the French 
Revolution, supposedly led to a more efficient economic organization in Britain, i.e. a better 
allocation of resources, and spurred economic growth (see e.g. De Soto, 1989; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992; Bogart and Richardson, 2008; Besley and Ghatak, 2010; Kishtainy, 2011) 
(Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). A number of institutionalist scholars, especially those inspired by 
North (1981, 1990)’s works, have also argued that property rights, including the intellectual 
property rights, stimulated the creativity of British inventors and so contributed to raise the 
rate of innovative activity in Britain. The early existence of a British patent system - enacted 
as soon as 1624 in the Statute of Monopolies - would then account for the early emergence 
of market-oriented technical inventions on the British ground (see e.g. North and Thomas, 
1973; Dutton, 1984; Sullivan, 1989, 1990). As North and Thomas (1973:155-156) contended: 
“Innovation will be encouraged by modifying the institutional environment, so that the 
private rate of return approaches the social rate of return. Prizes and awards provide 
incentives for specific inventions, but do not provide a legal basis for ownership of intellectual 
property. The development of patent laws provides such protection […] By 1700 England had 
begun to protect private property in knowledge with its patent law. The stage was now set 
for the industrial revolution”. The argument linking the British patent system with the British 
industrial revolution has been empirically funded on data showing an uprising in patenting 
activity during the second half of 18th century Britain (see e.g. Dutton, 1984; Mitchell, 1988; 
Sullivan, 1989; Zukerfeld, 2014). Besides the intellectual property rights, including the patent 
law, some historians have also emphasized the relatively high degree of Britain’s tolerance 
to explain why the country became a fertile ground for new ideas and inventions (see e.g. 
Braudel, 1982; Landes, 1983, Crouzet, 1991). As Mokyr (1999:38) argued, “British society 
exhibited a degree of tolerance for deviant and heterodox ideas that was unusual, though 
not unique […] Britain developed in the 17th century the ability to accommodate a high level 
of acceptance of different modes of thinking. The intolerance on the Continent toward 
dissidents led to the hemorrhage of technical talents from the southern Netherlands and 
France to countries where they were more welcome”. Thus, the Calvinist Denis Papin, who 
anticipated the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, fled France in 1675 and joined London 
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where he worked in collaboration with Robert Boyle, well-known figure of the Royal Society, 
and invented the steam digester, one of the first steps toward the steam engine. Following 
Weber (1905)’s work, a link has even been established in the literature between religion and 
economic progress (see e.g. Landes, 1998; Becker and Woessmann, 2009; de Pleijt and van 
Zanden, 2013; compare Delacroix and Nielsen, 2001; Barro and McCleary, 2003; Cantoni, 
2015). The non-renewal of the licensing Act in 1695, which was first adopted in 1662 after 
the restoration of King Charles II of England, is another illustration of Britain’s tolerance. By 
taking this decision, the British Parliament paved the way to press freedom and the free 
circulation of ideas (Aspinall, 1948; Black, 1987). In the wake of this political decision, several 
newspapers saw the light of day, some were directly created by Protestant immigrates. The 
supposed achievements of the Glorious Revolution, in terms of promoting the private and 
individual initiative, i.e. the entrepreneurial spirit viewed by Rostow (1960) as a necessary 
precondition for take-off45, were echoed by the new liberal economic thought that gradually 
gained in power and influence in the 18th century. This intellectual current was embodied by 
scholars such as Hume and Smith, and dubbed by metaphysicians such as Kant, Herder and 
Bentham. In Political Discourses, Hume (1752) thus advocated in favor of free trade and the 
international division of labor. In An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of 
nations, Smith (1776) objected to the direct intervention of the State into the economy and 
promoted a laissez-faire policy in accordance with the idea of self-regulatory market forces.  
 
Although attractive, the idea of an industrial revolution rooted into the Glorious Revolution 
has been strongly challenged in the literature. While acknowledging the importance of the 
institutional and political environment for economic development, some scholars have for 
instance pointed out the absence of discontinuity in institutions and growth in England after 
1688. The Glorious Revolution and the Bill of Rights reaffirmed - although it truly enhanced 
(Bogart and Richardson, 2011) - a longstanding tradition of parliamentary controls over the 
executive (see e.g. Harrison, 1990; Hartley, 1992; Hoyle, 1994; Braddick, 1994; Goldsworthy, 
1999; Allen, 2003; Clark, 2007a) (Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). More accurately seen as part of 
an evolutionary process of institutional development, the Glorious revolution moreover did 
not produce any acceleration of economic growth (see e.g. Van Zanden, 2001; Murrell 2009; 
Maddison, 2010 Broadberry et al., 2015) and so can hardly be credited for the industrial 
revolution that will occur almost one century later (Clark, 2014). Most analyses of financial 
statistics have also failed to detect significant improvements in the business environment or 
investment climate after 1688 (see e.g. Clark, 1996; Epstein, 2000; Quinn, 2001; Stasavage, 
2002; Sussman and Yafeh, 2006) (Allen, 2006). The absence of such kinds of discontinuity 
seemingly gives support to scholars (e.g. Mokyr, 1999; O’Brien, 2001; Harris, 2004; Clark, 
2007a; McCloskey, 2010a) who have strongly contested the belief that the British contracts 
and property rights, including those for state creditors, were insecure before the English 
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Glorious revolution. A question so arises: what are the origins of British proper rights? In the 
tradition of the soft institutionalists who tend to attribute institutional changes to economic 
factors46, Cordoba (2007:4) for instance contended that the set of economic opportunities 
offered by the Great Discoveries were responsible for the institutional changes that provided 
the proper incentives and rights to the British citizens: “the nature of the new economic 
opportunities opened to Britain by the Great Discoveries empowered common citizens, 
created an entrepreneurial base, and was conductive to a weaker monarchy that eventually 
lost power to other forces represented in the Parliament”. This idea was already present in 
Acemoglu et al. (2005b:546)’s previous influential work: “where “initial” political institutions 
(those established before 1500) placed signiﬁcant checks on the monarchy, the growth of 
Atlantic trade strengthened merchant groups by constraining the power of the monarchy, 
and helped merchants obtain changes in institutions to protect property rights. These 
changes were central to subsequent economic growth”. In the quest for the deep origins of 
the institutions conducive to economic prosperity, van Zanden (2002, 2008) recommended 
going further back in history and called for a “revolt of the medievalists”. Independently 
from the debate on the origins of the supposedly “good” British institutions, it has very often 
been defended that the latter were in any case not peculiar to Britain. For instance, other 
European regions such as the Dutch Republic and Venice also had parliamentary institutions 
exercising some degree of control over the government. With respect to the property rights, 
Allen (2003) noted that “property was secure in all the leading European countries, whatever 
their constitution”, thus joining other scholar’s conclusions for specific countries such as the 
Dutch Republic (see e.g. Mokyr, 1999; Ogilvie and Carus, 2014) and France (see e.g. Hoffman 
et al., 2000). Contrary to North and Weingast (1989)’s claims, a number of scholars have 
even argued that the restrictions on private property rights did increase in England after the 
Glorious Revolution, contributing to prepare the industrial revolution (see e.g. Harris, 2004; 
Hoppit, 2011; Allen, 2011). Attempting to solve these apparently conflictual views, Ogilvie 
and Carus (2014:447) stressed the necessity to make the distinction between generalized 
and particularized property rights: “The type of property right that is good for growth is a 
generalized right […] The property rights that were restricted in 18th-century England, by 
contrast, were largely particularized ones, which restricted use, transfers, and contracts 
involving assets to a limited subset of economic agents, who were deﬁned at least partly 
according to non-economic criteria”. This potentially explains the reason why some scholars 
have sometimes argued that France actually suffered from too secure property rights (see 
e.g. Rosenthal 1990; Innes, 1992, 1998; Hoppit et al., 1994).  
 
Concerning more specifically the intellectual property rights, scholars have long noted the 
difficulty to assess the exact role of the patent system in the British industrial revolution (see 
e.g. MacLeod, 2002; MacLeod and Nuvolari, 2006; Mokyr, 2009), especially as the results are 
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critically dependent on the reliability of the patent data as indicators of innovation (see e.g. 
Griliches, 1990; O’Brien and al., 1995, 1996; Nuvolari, 2004; Moser, 2005, 2012; Nuvolari and 
Tartari, 2011). If there seems to be a consensus on the idea that the rapid growth of British 
patents from the 1760s truly witnessed an upsurge of technological activity in Britain, it is 
not clear whether the patent law, as it existed, played a great incentive role in the processes 
that eventually brought about sustained economic growth (Mokyr, 2009). Before the reform 
of 1852, taking out a patent in Britain was expensive and time-consuming (see e.g. Harrison, 
2006). Moreover, it was common for patents to be infringed upon, and judges, at least prior 
to 1825, were rarely friendly to the patent holders, seeing them as monopolists (see e.g. 
Robinson, 1972)47. As Mokyr (2009:351) noted, “some of the most eminent men of science 
and technology in the period condemned the system as it existed […] It is striking that many 
of the important inventors of the Industrial Revolution viewed the patent system negatively 
and chose not to use it […] Many of the great engineers of the Industrial Revolution, Watt 
and Arkwrigt being the great exceptions, had little interest in patenting” (see also Dutton, 
1984; McLeod, 1988, 2009; McLeod and Nuvolari, 2010; Moser, 2007, 2012). O Grada 
(2014a:9) thus observed that “most of British goods and processes on show at the Great 
Exhibition of 1851 had been developed without a patent”. The patent was only one way of 
protecting and rewarding an invention. In many cases, secrecy turned out to be considered 
as a better solution. Using a sample of 759 high-skilled mechanics and engineers, Meisenzahl 
and Mokyr (2012) concluded that these workmen largely relied on secrecy and first-mover 
advantages to reap the benefits of their technological inventions. Financial rewards were 
also provided by some public institutions like the Royal Society. In England, the parliament 
rewarded inventors for socially valuable inventions. By way of illustration, the fathers of the 
mule and the power loom, respectively Samuel Crompton and Edmund Cartwright, were 
part of the beneficiaries of this political rewarding system. In any event, all inventors were 
not first and foremost motivated by the desire to maximize their income. Honor and social 
recognition were other possible incentives (Mokyr, 2009). Assessing the appropriability 
argument, Clark (2014:18) noted that “the industrial revolution economy was spectacularly 
bad at rewarding innovation”, and finally reached the conclusion that “there is no evidence 
that it was institutional changes providing better rewards for innovators in the Industrial 
Revolution era that unleashed mankind’s creative potential”. In the same vein, MacLeod 
(1988) argued that patents were more closely associated to the phenomenon of “emergent 
capitalism” than “inventiveness”. Also very doubtful about the role of the British patent law, 
O Grada (2014a:9) claimed that “Britain achieved and maintained technological leadership 
until mid-19th century with little resort to patents”. In a book entitled against intellectual 
monopoly, Boldrin and Levine (2008) even went as far as to say that “intellectual monopoly 
was not necessary for innovation and as a practical matter was damaging to growth, 
prosperity and liberty”48. Without questioning the potential incentive role of the patent law, 
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Mokyr (2009:354) paradoxically suggested that the English economy might have benefited 
from the failures of the English patent law: “had the system been more open and accessible, 
and had patents been more enforced, blocking patents and monopolies in rapidly changing 
industries may have slowed down the pace of progress. As it was, it may just have been 
enough to help keep Britain as the Workshop of the World until deep into the 19th century”. 
In line with Mokyr’s statement, Zuckerfeld (2014:16) also suggested that “the complex and 
inefficient mechanisms of the English patent system played a simple and efficient role 
fostering - but not at all causing - the launch of the industrial revolution”. Convinced that 
economic theory cannot account for the growth of patents in the second half of the 18th 
century, Zukerfeld attributed the upsurge in patenting activity in Britain to the institutional 
changes which supposedly contributed to feeding the dreams of individual enrichment. 
“Doing so, the [inefficient] patent system fostered both the innovative activity of individuals 
seeking rents and the social appropriation of the benefits of the innovations”.   
 
The other appealing idea that the British public authorities, operating through strengthened 
democratic institutions, sought to design a general policy conducive to economic progress all 
over the 18th century, and the effects of which would have culminated with the industrial 
revolution, has also been seriously challenged in the literature. As Mokyr (1999:31) wrote: 
any policy objective aimed deliberately at promoting long-run economic growth would be 
hard to find in Britain before and during the Industrial Revolution. To be sure, certain statutes 
aimed at encouraging progress […] But many of these acts were directed towards increasing 
the economic rents of a successful political lobby and their overall impact on technical 
progress at best ambiguous”. The slave trade, the mercantilist regulations and the Corn Laws 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
alternative interpretation. Watt is one of many clever inventors working to improve steam power in the second 
half of the eighteenth century. After getting one step ahead of the pack, he remained ahead not by superior 
innovation, but by superior exploitation of the legal system. The fact that his business partner was a wealthy 
man with strong connections in Parliament was not a minor help. Was Watt’s patent a crucial incentive needed 
to trigger his inventive genius, as the traditional history suggests? Or did his use of the legal system to inhibit 
competition set back the industrial revolution by a decade or two? More broadly, are the two essential 
components of our current system of intellectual property – patents and copyrights – with all of their many 
faults, a necessary evil we must put up with to enjoy the fruits of invention and creativity? Or are they just 
unnecessary evils, the relics of an earlier time when governments routinely granted monopolies to favored 
courtiers? That is the question we seek to answer”. And the authors finally concluded: “Had there been no 
patent protection at all Boulton and Watt certainly would have been forced to follow a business policy quite 
different from that which they actually followed. Most of the firm’s profits were derived from royalties on the 
use of engines rather than from the sale of manufactured engine components, and without patent protection 
the firm plainly could not have collected royalties. The alternative would have been to emphasize 
manufacturing and service activities as the principal source of profits, which in fact was the policy adopted 
when the expiration date of the patent for the separate condenser drew near in the late 1790s…. It is possible to 
conclude more definitely that the patent litigation activities of Boulton & Watt during the 1790s did not directly 
incite further technological progress…. Boulton and Watt’s refusal to issue licenses allowing other engine 






were all examples of economic policies maintained by the English parliament to defend the 
property rights and profits of powerful special-interest groups (Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). 
Thus, the Calico Act, which might have surprisingly favored the development of the British 
cotton industry (Mann and Wadsworth, 1931), was a protectionist measure passed in 1721 
under the pressure of the silk and woolen industries. The experience of other European 
countries, such as Poland (see e.g. Kaminski, 1975; Frost, 2006; Guzowski, 2013), the Dutch 
Republic (see e.g. Mokyr, 1974, 1980; Buyst and Mokyr, 1990; de Vries and van der Woude, 
1997; van Zanden and van Riel, 2004) and Prussia (see e.g. Brophy, 1995; Wheeler, 2011), 
also seemingly tends to show that the existence of powerful parliaments, exercising some 
control over the executive, was hardly enough to induce growth-friendly economic policies, 
especially when parliaments did not represent a diversity of views (Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). 
In these conditions, The advantage of Britain, where the State arguably did put into effect 
less harmful economic policies, and were less subject to the action of pressure groups (see 
Olson, 1982), was so less the existence of a powerful parliament than the absence, at least 
before 1800, of local authorities able or willing to enforce the supposedly harmful economic 
policies (Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). Even though lots of constraining rules and regulations still 
existed in legal books after 1688 and until deep into the 19th century, they were in fact often 
evaded with impunity (Mokyr, 1999). This situation contrasted with the extensive growth of 
state regulation in most European economies (Ogilvie, 1992, 1999; Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). 
As British economy became increasingly sophisticated, the local authorities, which actually 
proved to be little invasive in the economic field, were increasingly in charge of most internal 
administration. With the exception of international and colonial trade, which remained the 
object of great attention for the British Central State, Britain early had the characteristics of 
a decentralized “laissez-faire” economy (Mokyr, 1999).  
 
Besides the ambiguous role of the English parliament in designing growth-friendly economic 
policies, other arguments have been advanced in the literature to contradict the notion that 
the British industrial revolution was produced or simply favored by the voluntary action of a 
State henceforth committed to the development of the whole British economy. For instance, 
O’Brien (1991) highlighted the numerous flaws and weaknesses of the English legal system 
that accordingly failed to provide efficient solutions to trade disagreements and commercial 
disputes. In this respect, Mokyr (2008) emphasized the informal private order institutions 
and “cultural beliefs” - as defined by Greif (1994, 2006b) - which supposedly substituted for 
the formal institutions to maintain a safe environment in which British entrepreneurs and 
innovators could operate and collaborate freely. Another point often brandished to discredit 
the role of the public authorities in British industrial revolution is the sharp increase in public 
revenues from taxation in England between the Glorious Revolution and 181549 (see e.g. 
Mathias and O’Brien, 1976, 1978; O’Brien, 1988 and 2001; Hoffman and Norberg 1994; 
Bonney 1999; McCloskey, 2010a). Over this period, real gross national income rose by three 
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while real peacetime taxation increased by around fifteen (O’Brien, 2001). As Ogilvie and 
Carus (2014:458) noted: “This huge increase in government control over national resources 
after 1688 casts serious doubt on the view that 1688 marked an improvement in the security 
of ownership rights of British taxpayers”. In principle, the improved state capacity for raising 
funds after the Glorious Revolution might have supported growth-friendly economic policies. 
But the British State rarely turned into public entrepreneur, and most of the projects which 
are nowadays financed collectively in regard to their positive externalities, like education, 
transport and the promotion of “useful arts” - that is applied science and technology -, were 
mainly left to private initiative (Mokyr, 1999). Public expenditures were primarily devoted to 
military purposes (O’Brien, 1988, 2001), notably to finance the wars against France whose 
impact on Britain’s economy in the 18th century , although still debated, has been considered 
as negative and non-negligible by a number of scholars (see e.g. Williamson, 1987; Crafts, 
1987; Mokyr, 1987)50. The Old Poor Law, another specific British institution, has also been 
heavily criticized, especially by Malthus and his followers, for its supposedly harmful effects 
on economic activity and technological change. It has long been believed that the poor relief 
system in England, which was seemingly generous (Ottaway, 2013) and well-developed in 
richer parishes and counties (Kelly and O Grada, 2011), encouraged excessive population 
growth, reduced labor supply through the alteration of the household trade-off between 
work and leisure, contributing to creating some unemployment trap, and hampered the 
professional and geographical mobility of labor in the context of a rising market society. 
However, the Old Poor Law might not have had its purported dramatic effects, particularly 
with regard to the population growth (see e.g. Huzel, 1969, 1980; Boyer, 1990; Kelly and O 
Grada, 2014a) and work incentives (see e.g. Pollard, 1978, Boyer, 1990). Moreover, the 
British poor relief system, viewed as a social risk-sharing institution, might have encouraged 
“risk-taking”, thus contributing to bringing about a new class of successful entrepreneurs 
(see e.g. Greif et al., 2011; Greif and Iyigun, 2012, 2013). According to Solar (1995), it might 
also have contributed to building a new wage-labor force by cutting the vital rope that linked 
the rural population to land. Finally, Mokyr (1999) also highlighted the additional flexibility 
that the British Poor Laws might have provided to the British industry. The political action 
and the institutional environment surely had a great influence on one country’s chance to 
undertake a successful industrialization (Bjorvatn and Coniglio, 2012; Vries, 2013). Designing 
a playing field considered as conducive to economic development is today the main goal of 
the industrial policy conducted by all Western governments. The secure property rights, the 
individual liberties, the political stability (see e.g. Olson, 1993, 2000) and the absence of 
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g) Modern science, technology, and human capital 
 
Addressing the European aspect of economic development - European miracle - that led to 
the emergence of a “convergence club” at dawn of the 20th century, a number of scholars 
have stressed the role of modern science in producing the British and European industrial 
revolution (see e.g. Musson and Robinson, 1969, Jacob and Stewart, 2004; Bekar, Carlaw and 
Lipsey, 2005; Jacob, 1988, 1997, 2007, 2014). In line with this view, the industrial revolution 
would owe much to the European scientific revolution. Although broader in scope, the term 
“scientific revolution” is nowadays traditionally used to describe the changes in the scientific 
thought that progressively took place in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, leading all the 
scientific disciplines to reorganize around new principles/axioms (Cohen, 2010). The starting 
point of the scientific revolution is very often located in the Copernicus’ heliocentric theory 
published in 1543 in a book entitled On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies (Jacob, 1997). 
The Copernican model placed the Sun, not the Earth, at the center of the Solar system and 
so heretically broke with the geocentric astronomy and the canonized Aristotelian tradition 
that was widely taught at universities and had been elevated to the level of religious dogma 
through the influence of Christian scholastic philosophy. The revolutionary book, published 
at the end of Copernicus’ life, set in motion a long series of works, notably by Galileo51, and 
episodes that produced the scientific revolution in Europe and gradually substituted the 
Aristotelian system, which had been enriched and completed by savants like Ptolemy, Euclid, 
Hippocrates and Galen, with the modern view of astronomy and natural sciences. As from 
the scientific revolution, science started to take a different look on the world and modified 
its method of investigation. In particular, the mathematical tool and the experimentation 
gradually substituted for the barren metaphysical speculations (Marage, 2006). Renouncing, 
at least partly, the idealist heritage of Aristotle, science freed itself from a heavy burden and 
broke into modernity (Lenoble, 1943). Descartes (1637) thus discredited the speculative 
scholastic philosophy and presented a new method, greatly inspired from the mathematics, 
to produce knowledge and access certainty: “Instead of the speculative philosophy usually 
taught in the schools, we may find a practical one through which we could know the power 
and actions of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies in our 
environment, as distinctly as we know the various crafts of our artisans; and we could 
thereby employ these forces in the same fashion for all the uses for which it is appropriate, 
and thus make ourselves as masters and possessors of nature”52. Descartes was convinced 
that the whole universe could be subject to a mathematical interpretation, thus joining in 
some way Galileo’s conclusions, and that the natural phenomena could be explained by 
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“mathematical reasons” operating in accordance with laws. In the discourses on the method, 
Descartes (1637) also introduced the early drafts of his famous philosophical proposition 
“cogito, ergo sum” he developed more precisely in two following books, namely Meditations 
on first philosophy (1641) and Principles of philosophy (1644), thus establishing the Cartesian 
metaphysical foundations of knowledge. The idea of mastering the nature was already well 
present in the work of Francis Bacon, often considered as one of the fathers of empiricism 
(Burns, 2001). Bacon violently rejected the scholastic interpretation of the classical texts and 
advocated in favor of an interpretation of the nature through both rigorous observation and 
theoretical reasoning based on new principles and deduction. As Bacon (1620) wrote: “Those 
who have treated of the sciences have been either empirics or dogmatical. The former like 
ants only heap up and use their store, the latter like spiders spin out their own webs. The bee, 
a mean between both, extracts matter from the flowers of the garden and the field, but 
works and fashions it by its own effort. The true labor of philosophy resembles hers, for it 
neither relies entirely or principally on the powers of the mind, nor yet lays up in the memory 
the matter afforded by the experiments of natural history and mechanics in its raw state, but 
changes and works it in the understanding. We have good reason, therefore, to derive hope 
from a closer and purer alliance of these faculties (the experimental and rational) than has 
yet been attempted”53. Bacon understood very early the complementary relationship that 
might link science and technology, i.e. theoretical knowledge and practical operation. He 
summed up the way to reach this complementarity by use of the following declaration: “we 
cannot command nature except by obeying her”. As Newton defended the idea of a scientific 
method that would strictly match theory with experimentation, fulfilling Bacon’s wish, this 
British scientist is nowadays often viewed as the savant who gave a completed form to the 
new science that eventually triumphed with the scientific revolution. Isaac Newton agreed 
with Descartes’ refusal of the Aristotelian doctrine, but criticized the Cartesians as they did 
not sufficiently rely upon the experimental techniques promoted by Bacon and Boyle. In the 
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Newton (1686) described the law of universal 
gravitation and rewrote the Kepler’s three universal laws of motion, thus setting up the 
bases of classical mechanics. Newton’s famous proposition “Hypotheses non fingo”, through 
which Newton elevated to the highest scientific level the methodology aiming at discovering 
new mathematical relationships through the empirical observation of natural phenomena, 
was brandished as a principle by his successors and inspired generations of experimenters 
(Marage, 2006), especially those of the Royal Society: “For whatever is not deduced from the 
phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, 
whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this 
philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards 
rendered general by induction. Thus it was that the impenetrability, the mobility, and 
impulsive force of bodies, and the laws of motion and of gravitation, were discovered”54. Not 
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solely astronomy but all the physical (electrophysics, thermal physics, etc.) and scientific 
disciplines benefited from the new scientific thought and made great progress during the 
scientific revolution and the subsequent 18th century Enlightenment. The new experimental 
science, equipped with revolutionary ideas, powerful mathematical tools and high-potential 
technical instruments, whose development was favored by the increasing recognition of the 
arts and crafts, progressively imposed itself as the most important source of explanation and 
domination of the world (Marage, 2006). 
 
Regardless of whether Britain enjoyed scientific leadership on the eve of modern economic 
growth, there is an old discussion in the literature on the exact role of science in the British 
industrial revolution. Were the British technological inventions of the late 18th century and 
early 19th century the industrial and commercial products of the scientific revolution? Most 
of the debate actually developed around the argument formulated by Musson and Robinson 
(1969) that the British industrial revolution was not unrelated to the scientific revolution and 
required something more than the “uneducated empiricism” (p.87) suggested by traditional 
historiography55 (O Grada, 2014a). Yet although some direct connection can be established 
between science and some of the industrial inventions, such as the chemical inventions and 
arguably the steam engine, scholars have found it hard to associate the main technological 
breakthroughs of the British industrial revolution with the scientific discoveries of its time 
(Mokyr, 2005b, 2011). Thus, a number of historians and economic historians have criticized 
Musson and Robinson’s focus on science, arguing that early British inventions were mostly 
empirical and owed very little to direct scientific guidance and knowledge (see e.g. Mathias, 
1972, McKendrick, 1973; Hall, 1974; Cookson, 1994; Mitch, 1999; Allen, 2009b; O Grada, 
2014a). In parallel, some authors (see e.g. Gillispie, 1957) have stressed that the majority of 
the contemporary scientific advances were peripheral to industrial technology and so hardly 
subject, at least initially, to industrial application. At best case, science tried to provide the 
incumbent technologies with an implicit theoretical base (see e.g. Reynolds, 1983)56. As 
Mokyr (1999:50-51) noticed, “in the development stage of the basic inventions, in which 
engineers and technicians on the shopfloor improved, modified, and debugged the 
revolutionary insights of inventors such as Cort, Cartwright, and Roberts to turn them into 
successful business propositions, pure science played only a modest role […] If science played 
a role in the Industrial Revolution, it was neither through the "pure" foundation of technology 
on scientific understanding nor through the role of scientists in invention but rather through 
the spillovers from the scientific endeavor. In this respect, Mokyr (2000b) distinguished 
between three closely interrelated phenomena: scientific method, scientific mentality and 
scientific culture. Scientific method involves, among many others, accurate measurement, 
controlled experiment and the accumulation of “useful knowledge” (Mokyr, 2002) through 
activities of classification, reporting and cataloguing, whose importance was precociously 
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emphasized by the great philosopher and scientist Francis Bacon (see Yeo, 2003). Scientific 
mentality refers to the entrepreneurs’ belief in the rationality and predictability of nature. 
Finally, scientific culture translates the entrepreneurs’ confidence in the capacities of the 
new (applied) science to solve practical or technical problems and serve economic interests. 
According to Jacob (1988, 1997, 2007), science contributed to British economic success by 
designing the cultural and intellectual background for the British industrialists. In particular, 
British industry would owe a quite important debt to mechanical science and chemistry. In a 
book entitled The first Knowledge Economy, Jacob (2014) recently reaffirmed her position, 
arguing that the British industrial revolution resulted from the emergence of a new original 
class of entrepreneurs within a new industrial culture. By the mid-18th century, the British 
industry would have been increasingly penetrated by Newton’s insights (Jacob and Stewart, 
2004) and more generally modern science (Bekar and al., 2005). Goldstone (2006, 2009) 
attributed the British prosperity to the diffusion of the engineering culture - directly derived 
from Galileo’s works on mechanics (Cardwell, 1972) - into the technological world of the 
production57. Shedding light on the culture of the Enlightenment, Mokyr (2005b, 2010a, 
2011) proposed to explain British industrialization as a byproduct of the scientific revolution, 
that took a particular intellectual turn in the 18th century (Clark, 2012b). Mokyr (2005b:291) 
used the expression “Industrial Enlightenment”, defined as “the belief in the possibility and 
desirability of economic progress and growth through knowledge”, to describe the slice of 
the Enlightenment movement that supposedly bridged the scientific and industrial 
revolutions58. Providing a critical assessment of Mokyr’s thought, Allen (2006:14) noted: “the 
Industrial Enlightenment emphasized the application of the scientific and experimental 
methods to the study of technology, the belief in an orderly universe governed by natural 
laws that could be apprehended by the scientific method, and the expectation that the 
scientific study of natural world and technology would improve human life”. According to 
Mokyr, but also to several other scholars (see e.g. Goldstone, 2006, 2009; McCloskey, 2010a; 
Jacob, 2007, 2014; Meisenzahl and Mokyr, 2012), the British innovative entrepreneurs in the 
early stage of the British industrial revolution were to some extent the embodiments of the 
Enlightenment movement.  
 
Yet, as Clark (2012b:89) contended, “the industrial revolution was largely made not by the 
Philosophes in the Salons, or the professors in the Universities, but by Craftsmen with limited 
formal education solving basic technical problems”. This raises the following question: how 
did the culture that supposedly forged the link between science and industry disseminate 
into the economy? Addressing this question, Goldstone (2006, 2009) emphasized the 
importance of the social supports that arose in the 17th and 18th centuries and eventually 
made possible the combination of new approaches to knowledge and their commercial 
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application by private entrepreneurs. In the same vein, Mokyr (2005b, 2010a, 2011) shed 
light on the 18th century Enlightenment which supposedly carried out many aspects of the 
Baconian program through institutional developments that increased both the amount of 
knowledge and its accessibility to those who could make the best use of it59. These 
institutional changes, which rooted into the works of “cultural entrepreneurs” - as Mokyr 
(2013b) called them - like Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton, made Britain and Northwestern 
Europe more friendly to innovative activity. In this respect, Mokyr (2011) identified four 
different headings under which the application of the Baconian program allowed to increase 
the amount of “useful knowledge” – thus giving progressively  access to more and more skill-
biased technologies (O’Rourke et al., 2013) 60. They are the research agenda, the capabilities 
such as the mathematics and the scientific instruments, the free selection of ideas, and their 
diffusion. Concerning the last point, the literature has proposed various channels through 
which the new scientific thought might have permeated the entrepreneurial culture. They 
include, among many others, the scientific societies like the Royal Society (funded in 1660), 
the publication of scientific books like the Encyclopédie and the “Newtonian textbooks”, and 
the provincial scientific society meeting places, like coffeehouses and masonic lodges, where 
lectures on scientific subjects were organized. By raising the intellectual value of tolerance 
and liberty, the Enlightenment movement was per se favorable to the diffusion of new ideas 
in the society. Mokyr (2010a) thus highlighted the rise in the absolute and relative number 
of published books on scientific topics and technology over the period 1700-18006162. 
Contemporary J.T. Desaguliers (1744)’ writings interestingly report the development of a 
new “business of science” that consisted in marketing natural philosophy and mathematics. 
In Britain, the popular scientific lectures and the multiplication of the provincial scientific 
societies during the second half of the 18th century also seemingly revealed the growing 
connection between science and industry (see e.g. Thackray, 1974; Inkster, 1991). Greatly 
present in the northern regions of England and the Midlands, these societies were places at 
which industrialists, scientists, and enlightened philosophers met together and discussed. 
The Lunar Society of Birmingham was a famous example (see e.g. Schofield, 1957, 1963). It 
housed a lot of prestigious figures like the savant Joseph Priestley, the physician and botanist 
Jonathan Stokes, the natural philosopher Erasmus Darwin, the great industrialists Matthew 
Boulton and Josiah Wedgwood, and the inventor James Watt. Also member of the Lunar 
Society, the industrial chemist James Keir stated in his Dictionary of Chemistry (1789) that 
“the diffusion of a general knowledge, and of a taste for science, over all classes of men, in 
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every nation of Europe, or of European origin, seems to be the characteristic feature of the 
present age”. In sharp opposition to most cultural historians, Allen (2006, 2009b) yet refuted 
the idea that “high science”, an activity reserved to a small elite, was responsible for the 
changes in the popular culture in Britain. In particular, Allen advocated against the idea that 
the provincial scientific society meeting places contributed - with truly a few exceptions - to 
spread scientific culture into the world of production. According to Allen (2006:15), these 
places were above all “institutions at which science was talking to itself”. Quite In the same 
vein, O Grada (2014a) argued that the provincial scientific societies were exclusive and 
played only a limited role in disseminating scientific knowledge. Moreover, the commercial 
and manufacturing class would have rather seen such institutions as a stairway to social 
ascension (see e.g. Cardwell, 1970; Thackray, 1974; Cookson, 1994; Uglow, 2002; Jones, 
2009)63. The belief that the typical innovative entrepreneur of the British industrialization 
was enlightened and, to some extent, connected to new science is actually far from being 
consensual in the literature. As Clark (2012b:90) contended, “the Industrial Revolution was 
not about grand designs for social engineering, the distinctive focus of the Enlightenment, 
but about cheaper production of textiles, coal, iron and motive power. Most of the focus of 
the Enlightenment had little bearing on this”. In his review of Mokyr (2010a)’s book entitled 
The Enlightened Economy, Clark (2012b) also highlighted the difficulty of distinguishing 
between the different idealist accounts of the British industrialization, especially between 
Mokyr’s “Industrial Enlightenment” and McCloskey (2010a)’s “Bourgeois Revaluation”. 
McCloskey (2010a) indeed defended, in line with Perkin (1969)’s pioneer work, that the 
enhanced social status for entrepreneurs played a great role in British economic success, 
which appeared in what North et al. (2009) have called an “open access society”. “How much 
is the Industrial Revolution the product of enhanced rationality, as opposed to just enhanced 
social status for entrepreneurs and the activities they had always carried out?” (Clark, 
2012b:90).  As an attempt to characterize the “typical” inventor of the British industrial 
revolution, Allen (2009b) has recently produced a database of eighty high-profile inventors. 
Among them, about one half had enlightenment connections. In the area of textile, a sector 
which contributed significantly to productivity growth during the industrial revolution (see 
e.g. Harley, 1993; Clark, 2007a, 2014), Allen yet observed that most important inventors had 
little or no connection to the Enlightenment. Doing the same kind of exercise, Meisenzahl 
and Mokyr (2012) found that less than one-fourth of the 759 listed “British tweakers and 
implementers” had any schooling other than an apprenticeship, while only one in seven was 
a member of a scientific society like the Manchester Lit and Phil (cited in O Grada, 2014). 
They also observed that skilled workmen were seemingly affected by the new Enlightenment 
culture as they often published their work and engaged in debates over contemporary 
technological and social questions. 
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The proponents of the view that science made great contribution to the British industrial 
revolution have in fact increasingly used the argument that most of the foremost industrial 
inventors were not “untutored”, as it has long been thought, but “educated” and equipped 
with scientific knowledge and intuitions, which supposedly fed their technological creativity 
and comparative advantage in producing inventions, and particularly microinventions. In this 
respect, some scholars have argued that one possible advantage for Britain - compared with 
France - was that British science was more pragmatic and applied (e.g. Kuhn, 1977; Inkster, 
1991, Jacob, 1988, 1997). Concerning the entrepreneurs’ education, Musson and Robinson 
(1969:88) noted: “In recent years historians of education have done much to illuminate this 
question and their findings have suggested that a knowledge of science was more widely 
diffused through industrial society than has hitherto been suspected”. In agreement with this 
statement, Jacob (2007) used the expression “hybrid savant-technologists” to describe the 
entrepreneurs of Leeds whose workshop arguably was a place where science interconnected 
with technology. As Jacob (2007:198) wrote: “In the critical first generation of mechanization 
that began in the 1780s, linen and wool manufacturers in Leeds, like their counterparts in 
Manchester, deployed scientific knowledge of a mechanical sort - and chemistry - to assist in 
the invention of new industrial processes and forms of industrial life”. Although convinced 
that science played a crucial role in the British industrial revolution, Jacob (2014) yet recently 
confessed that how scientific knowledge was acquired and diffused within British industry 
remained a mystery. The debate on the level of scientific knowledge deployed by British 
inventors has actually been part of a larger debate on the role of human capital in the British 
industrial revolution. If the current literature widely emphasizes human capital as one of the 
most important determinants of both economic growth64 and per capita income65, the exact 
role of human capital in the British industrial revolution is still very controversial. Observing, 
among others, a rise in literacy66 and numeracy rates in pre-industrial Britain67, a number of 
scholars have stressed human capital as a candidate source of the industrial revolution (see 
e.g. Tamura, 2002; Galor and Moav, 2004; Becker et al., 2011; Kelly et al., 2014; Madsen and 
Murtin, 2015). Yet international comparisons have shown that Britain actually did not enjoy 
any leadership in literacy and numeracy on the eve and during its industrial revolution. As 
Clark (2014:237) wrote: “Literacy rates in England in 1780 were not high by the standards of 
many other parts of northwest Europe. Literacy rates then exceeded those of England in 
Scotland, the Netherlands, much of Germany and in Scandinavia”. Around 1800, literacy 
rates amounted to approximatively 60% for British males and 40% for females. It was slightly 
better than France, but worse than the Netherlands and Germany (Reis, 2005:202). Contrary 
to Stone (1969)’s findings, several studies have even evidenced a stagnation or decrease of 
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literacy in England, at least in some industrializing districts such as Lancashire and Cheshire, 
during the industrial revolution period (see e.g. Sanderson, 1972; Schofield, 1973; Laqueur, 
1974; Cressy, 1980)68, thus giving credit to the “deskilling hypothesis” which supports the 
ideas that the industrial revolution raised the demand for unskilled workers and that human 
capital accumulation cannot account for British economic progress before 1850 (see e.g. 
Nicholas and Nicholas, 1992; Goldin and Katz, 1998; Mitch, 1999, 2004; Kirby, 2005; 
Humphries, 2010, 2013b; de Pleijt and Weisdorf, 2015). As Sanderson (2013:31) however 
said: “Those who still regard education as important could fairly point to the rise in literacy 
between the 1690s and the 1760s as establishing a threshold for industrialization, whatever 
dip ensued subsequently”. In any event, it is by now widely accepted that Britain did not 
enjoy any advantage in schooling or formal institutions that provided human capital on the 
eve of and during its industrial revolution (Mokyr, 2013a). In agreement with this view, Galor 
(2005:194, 2011:30) declared: “In the first phase of the industrial revolution, human capital 
had a limited role in the production process. Education was motivated by a variety of 
reasons, such as religion, enlightenment, social control, moral conformity, sociopolitical 
stability, social and national cohesion, and military efficiency. The extensiveness of public 
education was therefore not necessarily correlated with industrial development and it 
differed across countries due to political, cultural, social, historical and institutional factors”. 
Based on a sample of 7459 British mechanics and engineers, Meisenzahl and Mokyr (2012) 
also found that formal education played only a minor role in stimulating inventive activity 
during the British industrial revolution, thus supporting Mitch (1999)’s view that educational 
standards were low in Britain and inessential for economic development. Quite in the same 
vein, McCloskey (2010a:162) recently contended that human capital by itself had only little 
effect: a miner at the coal face may have to be skilled, but the hewer’s skill had nothing to 
do with formal education and book learning. The same was true for skilled textile workers, 
construction laborers, sailors, etc. (cited in Mokyr, 2013a). Attempting to rehabilitate human 
capital as a key factor for the British industrialization, a number of scholars have been highly 
critical of the studies that only use aggregate data on education or literacy rates to assess 
the level of human capital of the average worker in the economy, stressing the role that the 
British engineers and entrepreneurs at the top of the skill or knowledge distribution might 
have played (see e.g. Mokyr, 2005a, 2010a; Kelly et al., 2014; Squicciarini and Voigtlander, 
2014; van der Beek, 2014). As Mokyr and Voth (2009:5) noticed: “The British Industrial 
Revolution was carried not by the skills of the average or modal worker, but by the ingenuity 
and technical ability of a minority”. In this respect, the literature has increasingly devoted 
attention on British education “outside the schools”, notably shedding light on the potential 
importance of the British apprenticeship system as a means of transmitting knowledge, like 
tinkering abilities (McCloskey, 2010a) and the mysteries and secrets of trade (Farr, 2000), 
compensating for the flaws of the scientific texts and patents in disseminating technological 
knowledge (Epstein, 2004), and substituting for the learned societies and formal educational 
institutes (see e.g. Epstein, 1998; Humphries, 2003, 2011; Mokyr, 2010a, 2013a; Meisenzahl 
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and Mokyr, 2012; Minns and Wallis, 2012). Long viewed as an hindrance to innovation, the 
British apprenticeship system might actually have helped human capital formation and thus 
spurred technological change, especially as it was relatively open and accessible (see e.g. 
Mitch, 2004; Leunig et al. 2011; Minns and Wallis, 2013), flexible (see e.g. Wallis, 2008), and 
not as restrictive as in other European nations like France (see e.g. Kaplan, 1993; Crowston, 
2005). Thus, O Grada (2014a:8) recently contended that “most of the foremost inventor-
entrepreneurs of the Industrial Revolution were of rather modest, artisanal origins […] The 
artisans-made-good were the most talented and ambitious products of a system that 
combined basic schooling in literacy and arithmetic with apprenticeships based mainly on 
learning-by-doing”. According to Meisenzahl and Mokyr (2012), Britain’s technological lead 
on the eve and during the first industrial revolution69 was based upon “the supply of highly 
skilled, mechanically able craftsmen who were able to adapt, implement, improve, and tweak 
new technologies and who provided the microinventions necessary to make macroinventions 
highly productive and remunerative”. Britain’s advantage in terms of technological creativity 
would then owe a great deal to the British apprenticeship system which was the dominant 
form of skill formation at that time. Stressing the importance of the information exchange 
channels, like the British apprenticeship system, Abramson and Boix (2014) found in a recent 
study that “economic growth was only possible when there was a population of craftsmen 
who embodied a given stock of technological know-how that enabled them to take 
advantage of the technological breakthroughs of the 18th-century”70. The basic idea of this 
result is that worker skills facilitate technology adoption and so innovation71. This hypothesis 
is also present in other studies (e.g. Becker et al., 2011) which aim at showing that human 
capital facilitated the adoption of the new British industrial technologies in countries other 
than Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries. Another diffusion channel largely emphasized by 
the literature is the migration of British artisans and manufacturers, i.e. the migration of 
British skills, to other countries - for instance France (e.g. Henderson, 1954; Mathias, 1975; 
Harris, 1989). Besides the relatively important presence of highly skilled - in terms of ability 
and dexterity - mechanics and engineers in Britain on the eve of the industrial revolution, 
Kelly et al. (2014, 2015) also highlighted the physical condition of the average British worker 
as a crucial determinant of the quality of the British labor force. According to the authors, 
better nutrition made British workers healthier and taller, which can be viewed as a higher 
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degree of health human capital (see Schultz, 2002; Madsen, 2014), thus enhancing their 




The British industrial revolution is still home to great mysteries. In particular, the causes of 
the British industrialization are still heatedly debated in the literature. As Clark (2012b:1) 
recently noted: “The British Industrial Revolution is the key break in world history, the event 
that defines our lives. No episode is more important. Yet the timing, location, and cause of 
this Revolution are unsolved puzzles”. The difficulty partially arises from the fact that a broad 
spectrum of theories, both economic and non-economic ones, can potentially explain the 
industrial revolution and, more generally, the Great Divergence between some economically 
successful nations and the rest of the world. While this is hopeful, as it may be dangerous to 
overestimate the explanatory power of any single factor, the high multiplicity of possible 
theories has led Glaeser (2010b) to conclude that the industrial revolution would never be 
fully understood: “While the reader craves a simple explanation, there is none to be had. The 
entire question of why the industrial revolution started in England will never be definitively 
answered. The event was sui generis a bolt of lightning; and there is a myriad of possible 
explanations for it. Some of those theories can be rejected, but many of them remain 
reasonable. The scholarly, if unsatisfying, path is to understand the details of the British 
Industrial Revolution and then judiciously to suggest which forces may have played a major 
role, and which theories are pure balderdash”. Every new reasonable theory inevitably adds 
complexity to the story of the industrial revolution, but also contributes doing better justice 
to the historical reality, deepening our understanding of that major economic event, which 
improves as we gather more reliable data and information on the empirics of the industrial 
revolution.   
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